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113 16 The Line Hardens Just as the first leaks of the negotiations were fueling activists’ distrust and anger, Bill Novelli’s earnest entreaty to a meeting in Washington of state tobacco control advocates, was, in essence: “Trust us, we’re talking to your leaders.” They didn’t. They thought they were the movement’s leaders. By the end of April, as antagonism mounted within the tobacco control movement over the negotiations, the Center and its quiescent allies in the leadership of the Cancer, Heart, AMA, and Pediatrics groups were finally roused to respond to the criticisms. At Bill Novelli’s and Matt’s urging, the Cancer Society’s John Seffrin and the Heart Association’s Dudley Hafner convened a meeting in Chicago of voluntary health organization heads to shape a response to the complaints of Matt’s perceived lone-ranger role as a public health negotiator. They intended to broaden the representation of public health groups at the table, and Matt was anxious to share the load—and the opprobrium. The plan was to offer a seat at the negotiating table to each of the major organizations, and to create for Matt and the other negotiators a technical advisory committee of veteran tobacco control experts, as least some of whom had voiced concerns about the terms of the negotiations. The Lung Association had already made its decision to cast its lot with the dissidents, not with its former allies Cancer and Heart. Its Washington lobbyist, Fran Dumelle, alerted Congressman Henry Waxman to the meeting. He demanded to be invited but was turned aside on the grounds that this was to be a meeting only of nongovernment advocates. Defiantly, Waxman, Stan Glantz, and Julia Carol crashed the meeting, trailed by a crowd of cameras. They demanded to be heard in opposition to the continuation of any public health representation at the table and proceeded to attack the process and the tacit support that the groups were seen to give to a negotiated settlement. When the intruders left, the group leaders, including John Garrison 114 Smoke in Their Eyes of the ALA, solemnly weighed the benefits and risks of Matt’s continuing participation and of sending more representatives to the table. Ultimately, all except the AMA decided that it would be prudent to keep their powder dry and wish Matt and Bristow well—leaving themselves maneuvering room to denounce or make demands on the terms of any settlement ultimately negotiated. Only the AMA had, in Dudley Hafner’s words, “the courage” to join Matt. The group designated as its representative its past president, Dr. Lonnie Bristow, long a strong advocate for tobacco control as a senior volunteer within the AMA, who was nonetheless not seen as an independent advocate by the activists. In truth genuinely supportive of Matt’s leadership from the onset, Bristow worked closely with Matt, and rarely, if ever, did they disagree. As time went on, Bristow joined with Matt, Washington attorney general Christine Gregoire, and Massachusetts assistant attorney general Tom Green to take the lead in negotiating the public health issues. Seffrin and Hafner at least insisted that the group make clear that Myers and Bristow were at the table with their full support, if not their proxy, for the terms of any settlement the two might agree to. Even John Garrison agreed that he did not object to Matt’s and Bristow’s participation in the discussions. And Seffrin instructed his Washington staff to develop a balanced position paper on the settlement talks that recognized the potential benefits of the settlement as well as the need for careful scrutiny. But that position paper took two months to develop and distribute to ACS staff and volunteers—reaching them two weeks after the settlement was announced, and too late to temper restiveness about ACS’s role in the negotiations. Bill Novelli believed that little was to be gained from responding to or debating the Center’s critics. On the one hand, he looked to the AMA and the other major health voluntary organizations as the crucial constituency , whose support would determine the fate of any settlement coming out of the negotiations. On the other hand, he saw a chorus of dissident voices, representing no organized constituency, that would only be inflamed and emboldened—and given unwarranted legitimacy —by his or Matt’s efforts to respond to them. Stan Glantz, especially , he saw as a tar baby—the more one struck back at him, the more enmeshed one became...

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