Cables, Crises, and the Press: The Geopolitics of the New Information System in the Americas, 1866-1903

12: The Panama Conspiracy

257 chapTer Twelve The Panama Conspiracy The preSS Coverage of the Cuban revolution for independence and the Spanish-American War established that reporters from the United States were capable of probing into the internal affairs of a Hispanic political entity (Spain’s colony of Cuba) and tracking the course of naval and military conflict in the West Indies, albeit often with a sensationalist and patriotic slant. The Cuban controversy and the Spanish-American War were front-page news, and the circum-Caribbean—especially the long-discussed Panama Canal—likewise held the public interest. It is somewhat surprising, therefore , that a plot to break the province of Panama away from Colombia to enable the United States to build the canal escaped the attention of scores of journalists who had considerable experience in the area. The press did encounter rumors about a revolutionary conspiracy but could uncover no more information than a few vague stories that were enticing yet unsubstantiated . Secrecy was essential for the conspirators because their goal was to enlist the clandestine support of the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt in a plan to sever Panama from Colombia. Room 1162 of New York City’s Waldorf-Astoria hotel was the location for the planning of this political revolution that would impact the isthmus of Panama, the governments of Colombia and the United States, and eventually patterns of commerce and investment in the Americas, Europe, and East Asia. The occupant of the room and host for this meeting was Philippe 258 chapter twelve Bunau-Varilla, the French engineer who had worked on the ill-fated canal project in the 1880s and recently had turned his attention to political lobbying and the revival of the canal enterprise. Bunau-Varilla greeted his guest, Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero, at about 10:30 a.m. The two had known each other since the uprising led by Pedro Prestán in 1885. Amador was a seventyyear -old Panamanian physician and political activist. The purpose of the meeting on the morning of September 24, 1903, was to plan the revolt—but with some major differences—that Prestán had been unable to carry out. Instead of seeking to instigate an amorphous movement to overthrow established authority on the isthmus, the two conspirators of 1903 had a more specific agenda—the independence of the province of Panama from the nation of Colombia so that a new government could be created that would proceed with the signing of a treaty with the United States to grant to the rising power of the Western Hemisphere control of a strip of land that reached from the Caribbean to the Pacific to build an interoceanic canal. Unlike Prestán, Bunau-Varilla and Amador did not want to arouse the peasants and workers of Panama. Their goal was a quick and relatively quiet coup that would leave power in the hands of the local Panamanian elite of lawyers, businessmen, and politicians.1 Beyond this revolutionary goal, the two men did not have much in common . Bunau-Varilla had the connections with the power structure in the United States that Amador lacked. Only three weeks before, Amador had been ejected from the office of New York lawyer William Nelson Cromwell, the head of the Panama Railroad Company and, in Amador’s early vision of the revolt, a worthy coconspirator. Cromwell refused to join the conspiracy not out of any concern for legal proprieties but largely because he feared that the failure and public exposure of the revolt would cost the Panama Railroad Company its concession from the Colombian government. His hopes for a powerful ally in New York crushed, Amador turned to Bunau-Varilla in near desperation. Bunau-Varilla already had established contacts with Mark Hanna, the influential Senator from Ohio, and had worked with President William McKinley. After McKinley’s death, he gained the confidence of President Theodore Roosevelt and key members of the State Department. Bunau-Varilla sensed that the assertive chief of state and his advisors would cooperate in the accomplishment of Panamanian independence. The confident , energetic French engineer and the confused, disappointed Panamanian doctor devised a plan that relied on the connivance of the president of the United States.2 259 The Panama Conspiracy Both Amador and Bunau-Varilla had witnessed the U.S armed intervention on the isthmus in 1885 and were aware that warships dispatched by cabled messages could reach Panamanian waters in a few days...