The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900

3: Sharpening the Nation’s Sword

39 War with britain in 1812 would severely try the nation’s armed forces. over-optimism, a woefully inadequate infrastructure, and dismal leadership characterized the army’s performance in the conflict’s first eighteen months. neither regulars nor militia did well until new officers , better training, and an improved system of production and supply helped the Americans—backed by a few indians, most notably their former enemies, the iroquois—to secure a military stalemate against the british and their indian allies. However embarrassing the army’s early ineptitude, the War of 1812 had an enormous impact on the borderlands . indian threats to the ohio River valley region were extinguished and Creek military power in the south shattered. following the war, scattered frontier garrisons asserted U.S. authority, and fears of a standing army were temporarily quieted in the heady nationalism of the postwar years. Many looked to the regulars as a convenient means of improving the nation’s transportation system, a trend that held huge potential for the non-indian development of the West. ironically, however, the army refused to fully embrace these frontier duties, taking instead its inspiration from the traditions of europe. in early 1812, as relations between the United States and britain deteriorated and “War Hawks” gained political ascendancy, Congress increased +t h r e e∂ sharpening the nation’s sword 40 chapter three the army’s authorized strength to thirty-five thousand and permitted President James Madison to mobilize a hundred thousand militiamen for federal service. Having concluded that britain’s economic blockades, assistance to indians, and impressments of American soldiers imperiled the republic’s existence, Congress declared war that June. Such a move flew in the face of military reality, for Secretary of War William eustis and the eleven overworked clerks in his office were unprepared for a conflict. early appointments to high command, made with more consideration for politics than military ability, were consistently bad. “We shall never be successful while our troops are commanded by such men,” advised future secretary of war William H. Crawford. “for god’s sake . . . endeavor to rid the army of old women and blockheads.”1 optimists in Washington had envisioned a three-pronged invasion of Canada. but the absence of proper planning, the presence of intraparty Republican factionalism, the reluctance of many new englanders f i g . 8. “A scene on the Frontiers as Practiced by the humane British and their Worthy Allies.” This American cartoon portrays a British officer accepting a scalp from an indian ally. The scene may have been inspired by the August 1812 slaughter outside chicago. l i br a ry o f c o n g r e s s , usz 62-5800. sharpening the nation’s sword 41 to support the war, and gross incompetence allowed britain to seize the initiative. Since late 1811, Major general isaac brock, commander of british forces in Upper Canada, had envisioned a preemptive strike in case of war. boasting twenty-six years of military experience, the fortyone -year-old brock believed that seizure of Detroit and Mackinac would ensure the loyalty of Canadian militia and indian allies as well as counterbalance Yankee frontiersmen, who he characterized as “an enterprizing hardy race, and uncommonly expert on horseback with the rifle.” He could then mount “a protracted resistance,” which his undisciplined enemies would “soon tire” of battling. A mixed command of regulars, militia, and indians indeed forced the outnumbered garrison at fort Mackinac to surrender shortly after the war began, securing for britain control of northwestern Lake Michigan. “i never saw so determined [a] Set of people as the Chippewas & ottawas were,” noted one officer, who concluded that had the Americans not capitulated, “not a Soul of them would have been Saved.”2 news of fort Mackinac’s fall completed the collapse of brigadier general William b. Hull, who had been organizing an army at Detroit. though boasting a distinguished Revolutionary War record, Hull seemed too old and never gained the confidence of his militia. He feared that the loss of Mackinac had “opened the northern hive of indians” and that they now would be “swarming in every direction.” badly outnumbered, brock cleverly dressed some of his Canadian militia in cast-off redcoat uniforms and exploited the traditional dread of his indian allies. “it is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination,” brock warned direly, “but you must be aware, that the...