In Fire's Way: A Practical Guide to Life in the Wildfire Danger Zone

7: Return to Our Roots

 If people had just done housekeeping around their houses in Los Alamos, I think we would have seen considerably less destruction. Jack Cohen, Forest Service Fire Scientist In the wake of the Millennium Fire Season, the Clinton administration proposed massive federal expenditures to deal with the role of wildfire in forest health on public lands. It also submitted major programs to deal with fire hazard reduction on the forty million acres related to or in the Wildfire Danger Zone. This initiative has carried over into the Bush administration, with some modifications, including a greater willingness to use heavy equipment for forest thinning. Some $. billion has been allocated for thinning trees less than twelve inches in diameter at breast height, for post-fire forest restoration work, for prescribed burning , and for associated problems related solely to the  fire season. Following that, another $ million per year will flow toward fire until the year , when the total bill will amount to $ billion. Are such massive efforts and expenditures justifiable? The general question of thinning to enhance forest health is beyond the scope of this book. Here the specific question is whether and how to manage forests in the Wildfire Danger Zone. In Los Alamos,  percent of the homes burned: a total of four hundred. By and large, according to the Los Alamos fire chief, they were older structures that did not meet contemporary fire codes; that is, they had wood siding, shake roofs, single-pane windows, and so forth. Further, most of these structures belonged to people who ignored or openly flaunted recommendations about defensible space. Unfortunately, the most expedient “solution” to SEVEN Return to Our Roots everyone’s problem has taken the shape of a $ million federal buyout of all liability (see the discussion on the insurance industry below). Under the circumstances (and given the potential of “takings” lawsuits from homeowners), perhaps the bailout is the simplest, cleanest, quickest solution. But its “logic” begs more questions than it answers. Because the federal government started the Cerro Grande Fire, no one but the federal government is responsible for its aftermath. Needless to say, such solutions are unlikely to change behavior among homeowners . What happened at Los Alamos could happen in many communities throughout the Rockies and the Southwest. Surely we can do better! The National Association of State Foresters (NASF) seems to agree. Their Forest Fire Protection Committee and Subcommittee on Fire Resources Utilization has issued this report: • Citizens and decision-makers are dangerously unaware of the raw power of wildland fire, particularly where residential, commercial, or industrial development coexists with wildland conditions. To fire, fuel is fuel, whether it is a tree or a house. • Fire managers are held accountable for the safety of their personnel and in recent years have increasingly been held accountable for the impact of fire suppression efforts on land management issues and environmental concerns. The concept of accountability in fire suppression rarely extends to the costs incurred in suppressing fires. The containment of costs of suppression should be second only to safety. • A corporate will to change appears to be lacking throughout the national organization. Strong leadership in containing costs is essential and must be accompanied by the allocation of accountability for cost containment throughout the organization. • A series of factors have combined to create an environment that fosters increases in the cost of suppressing large fires. The least expensive fire is the one that never starts. Prevention dollars are the least expensive suppression dollars and the most effective. • Extreme levels of fuel loading present a staggering threat to public safety andecologicalintegrity.Onceignited,firesinmanyareaswillbesointense as to be unstoppable. Action must be taken to develop and implement a comprehensive national policy affecting federal, state, and private lands. • When an incident management team arrives to take control of a fire, too often line officers turn the fire over and assume a hands-off stance, leavingtheincidentmanagementteamtooperatewithminimalguidancefrom the host agency. The overall responsibility for the fire remains with the host agency and it is that agency’s obligation to remain closely involved. • As government budgets have become leaner and as federal and state workforces have aged, the preparedness level of federal and state fireCHAPTER SEVEN  fighting forces has slipped. Fire management planning thus becomes more important to ensure that resources are positioned and expended in the most effective and efficient manner possible. More Lessons from Cerro Grande Official reports usually make dry reading, but this one is worth the...