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Five • • Soissons I On the morning of July 15, 1918, I left Paris and, in the afternoon, rejoined the 18th Infantry, which had moved to the Forêt de Compiègne. There I learned that the division was scheduled for an early attack against the enemy’s entrenched position west of Soissons and south of the Aisne River. There was a rumor that I was to be assigned to command the 28th Infantry to replace Colonel Hanson E. Ely, just appointed a brigadier general. Nothing was official; division headquarters sent no advanced information or an order to confer with the commanding officer of the 28th Infantry. On the morning of the sixteenth, at Colonel Parker’s direction, I went out and thoroughly inspected the roads and trails leading to that portion of the then held French entrenched line, which was to be taken over by the 18th Infantry. Upon my return to Parker’s headquarters I gave him a full account of the area his regiment was to occupy. The next morning, the seventeenth of July, I received Special Order 195, headquarters, First Division, dated July 16, 1918, directing me to assume command of the 28th Infantry. The colonel was Frank Parker, not John H. (“Gatling Gun”) Parker. 1 During the night of July 16–17 the 28th Infantry had marched from its bivouac in the Forêt de Compiègne to some woods near Mortefontaine, 72 73 Soissons I and there, about 1:00 p.m., July 17, I found that regiment’s headquarters and took command. Shortly after joining my new command all brigade and regimental commanders were ordered to report to the division commander , Major General Charles P. Summerall, for a conference. General Summerall had been commanding the artillery brigade of the First Division ; but a day or two before had replaced General Robert L. Bullard as division commander. These changes gave the division, the artillery, and the 28th Infantry new commanders almost on the very day of the contemplated offensive. In my case, the change was made just 16 hours before the regiment went into battle. These are examples of how little our G.H.Q. cared about who commanded troops in battle. July 1918, was not the first time Mortefontaine appeared in American history. A century and more earlier, September 30, 1800, representatives of the United States signed a treaty of Mortefontaine with Napoleon at what then was the country estate of Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon’s brother. The treaty abrogated the alliance of 1778 with France, so necessary for the success of the American Revolution. In return the U.S. gave up claims for spoliations from France incurred during the European wars since 1793. It was part of Napoleon’s scheme for an Armed Neutrality, an organization of Europe’s neutrals against Great Britain. As General Summerall’s, after the battle, treatment of me was, in my opinion, unfair and completely undeserved, I warn my readers that even today, twenty-four years after the battle, I still resent his action, and admit that I bear him great dislike and am entirely out of accord with those who consider him a great war leader. At the division conference the division attack order was gone over. General Summerall personally repeated the words of the written order, Field Order No. 27, headquarters, First Division, July 16, 1918, that the infantry would attack in the “normal formation.” This formation had been taught the division during the winter 1917–18. As this formation was largely responsible for the terrible casualties suffered by the infantry in the Battle of Soissons, I will explain it in detail. The infantry companies had four platoons; and while the enlisted strength of a company was 250 men, it is probable that none of the platoons went into action with more than 50 men. As formed for the attack, .135.183.187] Project MUSE (2024-04-23 10:58 GMT) 74 Reminiscences of Conrad S. Babcock the 50-man platoon, commanded by a lieutenant, was divided into two sections, each section under a sergeant. The leading or assault platoon deployed one section (25 men) as skirmishers, at four or five paces interval between men, on a front of about 125 yards. The second section (25 men) followed the skirmishers at a distance of about 50 yards in a formation that is called a “line of squad columns,” which means a line of three squads (8 men to a squad) going forward as directed by the squad...

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