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Chapter Four: “Carnage and Destruction”—Fredericksburg, December 1862
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50 Chapter F our “Carnage and Destruction” Fredericksburg, December 1862 The Army of the Potomac Those of us who were well acquainted with Burnside knew that he was a brave, loyal man, but we did not think that he had the military ability to command The Army of the Potomac. —Major General Darius Couch, Army of the Potomac Frustrated with General George McClellan’s inability to take the initiative and with his manifest arrogance (to the point of disrespecting his superiors), Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck sacked the“Young Napoleon”and replaced him with the affable and obedient Ambrose Burnside. Even discounting the usual professional jealousy among senior military men, the generals in the Army of the Potomac found little to recommend Burnside for his new position. Moreover , Burnside himself had reservations about his ability to lead the army. In Washington, Union leadership withheld judgment, preferring to see how the newly appointed leader of the Army of the Potomac performed where it counted—on the field of battle. Burnside’s time of testing was fast approaching as November 1862 came to a close. One of Burnside’s first actions was to reorganize the Army of the Potomac into three “Grand Divisions.” The “Left Grand Division” was headed by Major General William Franklin; the “Center Grand Division” was led by Major Fredericksburg, December 1862 51 General Joseph Hooker; and the “Right Grand Division” was under the command of Major General Edwin Sumner. Each Grand Division had two corps of infantry along with artillery and cavalry, giving each general approximately forty thousand men. Burnside’s plan, with the endorsement of Washington leadership, was to pass through the city of Fredericksburg,Virginia, and drive on to Richmond where the intention was to capture the Confederate capital and put a swift end to the war. Ostensibly the three “Grand Divisions” would give Burnside the flexibility and muscle to overwhelm Robert E. Lee. As a doorway to Richmond, Fredericksburg was a key prize on the path to the Rebel capital and had important strategic attributes: the Rappahannock River, which passed by the city, was navigable by shallow-draft vessels; it was the nexus of a significant rail line; and it was located at the intersection of a network of well-maintained roads. One of those attributes was also a major hurdle—the Rappahannock. The river was nearly four hundred feet wide across from the city; the bridges had been burned by the Confederates; and Burnside had to get his army to the other side. Fording the river with an army anywhere close to Fredericksburg was risky, particularly for the newly minted general of the Army of the Potomac, who wanted to make a favorable first impression on his superiors in Washington. Burnside’s method for crossing the Rappahannock was to use a device as old as Caesar’s army—the pontoon bridge. Hauled to a crossing site by wagons , the pontoons—each 31 feet long and 5 ½ feet wide—would be linked together, floated across the river and anchored in place to form a proven, albeit unstable, platform on which men and equipment could cross a river. The general’s plan was to have Sumner’s Right Grand Division cross directly into Fredericksburg and Franklin’s Left Grand Division cross on a plain downstream from the city. The two-pronged approach, reasoned Burnside, would stretch Lee’s forces across a long front and keep the Confederate general guessing as to where to focus his efforts. Hooker’s Center Grand Division would be kept in reserve and deployed where it could have the greatest impact once an attack was begun. By midmorning on December 11, numerous attempts had been made by Union engineers (primarily the 50th New York Engineers) to span the Rappahannock River; fifty lay dead or wounded near the pontoons. As the fog lifted, the accuracy of the Confederate snipers improved, and the resolve of the Union engineers faded. Burnside, furious with the Confederate resistance that was interfering with the upper pontoon bridge’s construction, ordered his artillery to shell the houses along the river in an attempt to drive out the snipers. When the smoke settled, 150 artillery pieces had lobbed over 8,000 rounds into the town destroying or damaging many of the homes and commercial buildings. Yet the Confederates continued firing. [44.206.248.122] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 09:56 GMT) 52 Your Brother in Arms Finally, dismayed by the lack of progress bridging the river, Burnside approved a plan...