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Chapter Three: On the March—Maryland, Harper’s Ferry, and Virginia, November–December 1862
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36 Chapter Three On the March Maryland, Harper’s Ferry, and Virginia, November—December 1862 The Army of the Potomac I have just read your dispatch about sore-tongued and fatigued horses.Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything? —Abraham Lincoln, telegram to General McClellan, October 24, 1862 Union euphoria in the aftermath of the battle of Antietam was brief, but two watershed events resulted. European leadership—especially that of the British—cooled to the idea of recognizing the Rebel government in Richmond . Attempts by Britain’s chancellor of the exchequer, William Gladstone, and the foreign minister, Lord John Russell, to gain cabinet support for recognizing the Confederate states were voted down following the outcome at Antietam. France proposed a six-month armistice—along with dropping the trade blockade against the Confederates—that would be backed by France, Britain, and Russia. The armistice would clearly be of greater advantage to the Confederates and their trade interests with Europe. Britain and Russia both turned down France’s proposal. Increasingly, British leadership was equating the Confederate cause with the perpetuation of slavery. This moral position, coupled with the growing recognition, post-Antietam, that positive military Maryland, Harper’s Ferry, and Virginia, November-December 1862 37 momentum was building on the Union side, took official recognition of the Confederate states off the table for the British. The other watershed event following Antietam was the abolition of slavery in America through the Emancipation Proclamation. The Union advantage following Antietam gave Lincoln the glimmer of victory he needed to issue the proclamation. McClellan kept his negative opinion about the proclamation to himself. A number of powerful Democratic friends in New York pleaded with the general to accept the proclamation and not contradict his commander in chief. But members of McClellan’s staff were less temperate. Fitz-John Porter called the Emancipation Proclamation an “absurd proclamation of a political coward.” Another McClellan staff officer said that the reason Lee’s army had not been “bagged”atAntietam was because the purpose was to let neither army get much advantage over the other. In this way, a compromise could be made to save the institution of slavery. When Lincoln learned of the officer’s public remarks he had him cashiered. Responding to grumbling in the staff officer ranks, McClellan issued a general order to all of the Army of the Potomac reminding the army of the need to subordinate military opinions to civilian authority. There is an immobility here that exceeds all that any man can conceive of. It requires the lever of Archimedes to move this inert mass. —General Henry W. Halleck, October 1862 Despite strong showings at Antietam in mid-September and Corinth, Mississippi , and Perryville, Kentucky, in early October, these were not clear-cut, unambiguous Union victories. Lincoln and general in chief Halleck were growing impatient with the lack of aggressiveness at the top of the Army of the Potomac and with the Union army at the western front. Their dissatisfaction focused on the two responsible generals: George B. McClellan and Don Carlos Buell. As he reflected on his role at Antietam, McClellan became increasingly pleased with his performance. Yet this growing confidence was not sufficient to embolden him to take an aggressive stance. Thinking that Lee’s forces significantly outnumbered his own, McClellan instead chose to hunker down in a defensive posture along the Potomac River near Sharpsburg. Lincoln’s patience with Generals McClellan and Buell was reaching its breaking point. Lincoln removed Buell from command in the west in September because of his inaction in Kentucky, brought him back briefly, and then sent Buell packing in late October, putting Major General William S. Rosecrans in command. [3.95.233.107] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 11:27 GMT) 38 Your Brother in Arms The president’s growing dissatisfaction with both men was over lack of aggressiveness. (He said of McClellan, “He has got the slows . . . An auger too dull to take hold.”) Yet Lincoln was not blind to McClellan’s powerful relations with northern Democrats—the president’s own political adversaries. During the national elections of 1862 was not the time to throw the gunpowder of a McClellan dismissal on the political fire. While Washington leadership was fuming over McClellan’s lack of action, the general ordered the army to pack up and break camp on October 26. At last the Army of the Potomac was on the...