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Chapter Thirteen: “Strong Men Strengthened and the Weak Made Strong”—Petersburg and the Weldon Railroad Raid, October–December 1864
- University of Missouri Press
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224 Chapter Thirteen “Strong Men Strengthened and the Weak Made Strong” Petersburg and the Weldon Railroad Raid, October—December 1864 The Army of the Potomac And then amid it all, General Griffin came along, resolute, heroic, impressive , with assuring words and comforting promises of help. The wavery lines stiffened; strong men were strengthened and the weak made strong. From now on it was his fight, and his presence in inspiring the men was almost equal to the promised support of his batteries. —118th Pennsylvania Regimental History Like beads on a necklace, Union forts hung around the neck of Petersburg linked by breastworks to form a siege line that was a feat of engineering skill and a testimony to the excavating endurance of the Federal soldiers. Using a variety of tools, from picks and shovels to mess plates and cups, the Army of the Potomac had constructed an integrated string of over thirty forts and redoubts with connecting entrenchments by autumn 1864. Each Union fort—named for an officer killed in battle—was an original, no two the same in design. Accompanying the siege lines—one line facing toward Petersburg, the other a reverse line to ward off attacks from the rear—were a variety of Petersburg and the Weldon Railroad, October—December 1864 225 age-proven defensive accoutrements: abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and gabions, all devices used in military defensive operations for hundreds of years. After the engagement at Peebles’s Farm on September 30/October 1, Warren ’s Fifth Corps dug entrenchments extending Union siege lines further west, thereby forcing the Confederates to stretch their lines along a 35-mile-long front. Robert E. Lee’s men were spread thin in order to protect their remaining ground surrounding Petersburg. While their line held despite Union attacks , the Confederates had lost access to a number of key roads leading into the city and, consequently, their supply lines were significantly reduced. The civilian residents of Petersburg anticipated a difficult winter, knowing that fewer supply routes would mean shortages of food and fuel. October began with gloomy, drizzly days that remained cool through the late mornings and then, after sunset, settled into cold dampness that reinforced the concerns about a fuel shortage among the residents of Petersburg. The first frost on October 10 offered civilians and soldiers from both armies a harbinger of the approach of winter weather. Grant could almost taste a Union victory and knew that it would be only a matter of months before he overwhelmed Lee’s ragged,diminished army.Motivated by both the window of opportunity before winter set in and the bad press he was getting in the North, Meade approached a receptive Grant with a plan to cut one of the few remaining Confederate rail lines that supplied Petersburg. Meade’s plan involved using Hancock’s Second Corps to flank the Confederate’s right, cross Hatcher’s Run, move along Boydton Plank Road and then head for the South Side Railroad, two key transportation routes that, once taken, would further choke off Confederate supplies to Petersburg and Richmond. A Union cavalry division would screen the Second Corps’s advance and protect its left flank.Meanwhile,the Ninth Corps would put pressure on the Confederate lines at Peebles’s Farm, and the Fifth Corps would be available to support either the Second Corps or Ninth Corps as battle conditions warranted. General Butler’s men were to provide a diversion north of the James River commencing at the same time as the main assault on October 27. The attack plan,as conceived by Meade,was daring,sweeping,and promising —in theory. In fact the ferocity of the Confederate response and the idiosyncrasies of the local terrain caused the Union plan to collapse. On October 27, the Ninth Corps began its attack against the Confederate lines opposite Peebles’s Farm, but the Federals were not able to break through the resilient Rebel forces. The Second Corps marched down a country road ill-suited to such use, many places in the road being impassable for the large body of troops. Further complicating the progress of Hancock’s men, pockets of Confederate resistance harassed the Union troops as they attempted to cross streams along the route. [54.235.6.60] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 04:08 GMT) 226 Your Brother in Arms Hancock’s corps reached Boydton Plank Road at midmorning in the vicinity of Burgess’s Mill. Rather than Confederate cavalry and scattered Rebel resistance, the Second Corps...