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Chapter Ten: Winter Encampment, January–April 1864
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162 Chapter Ten Winter Encampment January—April 1864 The Army of the Potomac In the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations toward each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals . . . Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and the Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army, but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if not by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did not discourage their claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal arms, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. —Lt. General Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs The fires of the Army of the Potomac had essentially been banked by January 1864 as most of the troops focused on constructing snug log huts that would afford some refuge from the Virginia winter. Culpeper County north Winter Encampment, January—April 1864 163 of the Rapidan River, where winter quarters were established, became a military city with officers’ residences at the head of streets followed by enlisted quarters arranged according to rank. Chapels, infirmaries, cookhouses, and commissaries sprang up in orderly rows to provide for the needs of the army in cantonment. While most of the officers and enlisted men were enjoying the respite from marching and fighting,one man had no desire to sit by the fireside until spring. Judson Kilpatrick, West Point graduate and cavalry division commander, had a plan to strike at the heart of the Confederacy, a plan that he believed would surpass in audacity and daring those of his Confederate counterpart, J. E. B. Stuart. Kilpatrick envisioned a “hit-and-run” cavalry raid on Richmond that would unnerve the civilian population and Confederate government, sever Lee’s communication and supply lines with the capital,and leave the Army of Northern Virginia encampment isolated and vulnerable. Known derisively by his men as“Kill Cavalry,”Kilpatrick had contacts in Washington who were able to get his bold plan to Secretary of War Stanton and even to the president. This end run around both his cavalry commander,Alfred Pleasonton,and the commander of the Army of the Potomac, George Meade, gained a swift response. Lincoln asked Meade to send Kilpatrick to Washington. Once at the capital, Kilpatrick presented his plan to Stanton, who liked the boldness of the proposal . Saying that he was speaking for the president, Stanton told Kilpatrick that he was to add to his mission the distribution of Lincoln’s amnesty proclamation1 to the civilian population as his troopers rode through the streets of Richmond. As it was envisioned by official Washington, each cavalryman in Kilpatrick’s division would be given one hundred copies of the proclamation to pass out to Richmond’s residents. Further signaling his agreement with Kilpatrick’s plan, Stanton made a provision to reinforce his division; Kilpatrick would command 4,000 troopers for his raid on Richmond. Both Pleasonton and Meade grumbled about the infeasibility of the operation and its recklessness as a military initiative. The accompanying political mission—distribution of amnesty proclamations—would be best accomplished by undercover agents, not cavalry troopers, the generals argued. Kilpatrick ’s operation was fully approved by Washington, and the impetuous cavalry general was given full discretionary power to execute the raid by his Army of the Potomac superior officers. Just prior to the launch of the raid at the end of February, Kilpatrick was sent a twenty-one-year-old cavalry colonel with significant Washington connections and a level of bravado to rival that of his new commander. Ulric Dahlgren, son of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, had served previously in staff positions in the Union army after receiving his commission as captain [54.224.52.210] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 13:17 GMT) 164 Your Brother in Arms early in the war from Secretary Stanton.Young Dahlgren was returning to duty in early 1864 after recovering from a serious leg wound sustained while pursuing Lee’s army following Gettysburg. Recovering in Washington after having his leg amputated, Dahlgren was...