Your Brother in Arms: A Union Soldier's Odyssey

Chapter Nine: “Shooing Geese across a Creek” and Decision at Mine Run, October–December 1863

145 Chapter Nine “Shooing Geese across a Creek” and Decision at Mine Run October—December 1863 The Army of the Potomac To avoid misunderstanding,let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee’s army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city. —Abraham Lincoln, instructions to General Meade, Autumn 1863 Much like a large dog confronting a wily, agile fox, George Meade’s Army of the Potomac was superior in size (90,000 troops versus the Army of Northern Virginia’s 60,000), but Meade knew the “fox” was capable of quick attacks and could use its acknowledged boldness to circumvent his army and trap it between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers. Daily admonitions from 146 Your Brother in Arms Washington for Meade to seize the initiative and crush Lee’s army with his numerically superior forces only frustrated the general since the communications came in the form of “suggestions,” never direct orders, from Halleck or the president. In addition to having an abiding respect for Lee’s ability to direct his men in daring flanking movements, which they could accomplish with speed and ferocity, Meade also knew his own command limitations. Despite his army ’s numerical superiority, the five corps remaining with Meade had three new commanders: the highly respected Reynolds (killed at Gettysburg) had been replaced by John Newton, Sickles (wounded at Gettysburg), by William French, both unproven corps commanders. Former engineering staff officer Gouverneur Warren had replaced the redoubtable Hancock (wounded at Gettysburg) as Second Corps commander. Consequently, Meade’s confidence in three of his five corps commanders was not high as he moved his army along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad through Rebel territory in the late fall of 1863. To protect his army, Meade kept the five corps close together so that they could support one another in the event of a sudden move by Lee’s army. With official Washington urging him on (though still not offering specifics) Meade looked for an opportunity to turn the tables on the elusive fox. That opportunity came midday on October 14 near a rail station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Confederates under General Henry Heth, with urging from his corps commander , A. P. Hill, saw an opening to strike a Union force, all of whom were ostensibly in the midst of crossing a stream—Broad Run. Anticipating the vulnerability of the fording Federal troops, Heth ordered two of his brigades forward to attack the Yankees in midstream. What Heth did not know was that Warren’s entire Second Corps was in close proximity, concealed by an embankment .Warren’s men poured enfilading fire into the surprised Rebels. Instead of taking advantage of a small Union force that was vulnerable during a crossing, the Confederates were themselves the victims of, “as fine a trap as could have been devised by a month’s engineering. . . .”1 At the conclusion of the thirtyminute battle, 1,400 Confederates had been killed or wounded and 450 taken prisoner. Union forces sustained 300 casualties, 50 of which were deaths. The engagement at Bristoe Station was an embarrassing bloody nose for General A. P. Hill, who had authorized the action, and a significant boost in the reputation of General Warren as an effective field commander. Meade’s subsequently increased confidence in the former staff officer would serve Warren well at a critical decision point in the final days of November 1863. Meade again kept the Army of the Potomac on the move after the action at Bristoe Station. (The army had crossed the Rappahannock three times in Decision at Mine Run, October—December 1863 147 four days prior to that battle.) Thinking that...