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Chapter Six: “This Coveted Ground”—Chancellorsville, April–June 1863
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79 Chapter Six “This Coveted Ground” Chancellorsville, April—June 1863 The Army of the Potomac Here, on this open ground, I intended to fight my battle. But the trouble was to get my army on it. . . . By making a powerful demonstration in front of and below the town of Fredericksburg with a part of my army, I was able, unobserved , to withdraw the remainder, and, marching nearly thirty miles up the stream, to cross the Rappahannock and the Rapidan unopposed, and in four days’time to arrive at Chancellorsville, within five miles of this coveted ground, and all this without General Lee having discovered that I had left my position in his front. So far, I regarded my movement as a great success. —General Joseph Hooker, postwar interview, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War In April 1863, General Hooker’s elements for a successful offensive campaign began to gel: the weather had improved, making it possible to move troops, artillery, and wagons over the unpredictable Virginia roads; the morale and state of readiness of the Army of the Potomac were high; and Hooker ’s subordinate command structure—while not stellar—was competent and reasonably loyal. The army now numbered almost 134,000 men and could field over 400 artillery pieces. It was, in Hooker’s own words,“The finest army on the planet.”The officers and men shared a buoyant optimism that they had not felt in a long time. 80 Your Brother in Arms Fighting Joe’s plan was to use his cavalry corps to cross the Rappahannock upriver from Fredericksburg and swing behind Lee in order to cut the Rebel lines of communications and supply with Richmond. Alas, for Hooker, the rains came in mid-April, quickly turning the Rappahannock into a surging torrent that made it impossible for Major General George Stoneman’s troopers to cross the river. Hooker’s admonishment to his cavalry general earlier in the month—“On you and your noble command must depend in a great measure the extent and brilliancy of our success”—now turned out to be wishful thinking as the Rappahannock grew in depth and force with the spring rains. Once news of the aborted cavalry assault reached Washington, a distraught Lincoln, accompanied by Secretary of War Stanton and General in Chief Halleck, met Hooker at Aquia, Virginia, on April 19 to discuss what options Hooker had in mind after the cavalry washout. Hooker’s “Plan B” was ambitious and complex. He would send his cavalry corps across the Rappahannock as before, but this time he would simultaneously send three corps of 42,000 men (the Fifth,Eleventh,and Twelfth) upriver to cross at Kelly’s Ford, swoop south and east crossing the Rapidan River at Ely’s Ford (the Fifth Corps) and Germanna Ford (the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps). The Union force would then come in behind Lee’s left flank by marching through a scrubby, overgrown wooded area, referred to as the Wilderness, to converge at the quiet crossroad clearing of Chancellorsville. In concert with these moves, the Union Second Corps would march to U. S. Ford on the Rappahannock and wait on the east side of the river until the Fifth Corps could move in behind the Confederate troops who were guarding the river crossing on the west side. Once the Rebels were driven from the ford, the Second Corps would cross the river to join the other three corps in the vicinity of the Chancellorsville crossroads. Adding to the complexity of these maneuvers, Hooker ordered the First and Sixth Corps to cross the Rappahannock downriver from Fredericksburg and attack Lee’s right flank. Hooker left the men of the Third Corps at the Union camp in Falmouth to serve as decoys while the other corps were moving into their respective positions up and down the Rappahannock to execute the right- and left-flank pincer movement against Lee’s troops. The brilliant, albeit complicated, battle plan met with official Washington ’s approval. On April 27, the wheels were put in motion to execute Hooker ’s grand spring campaign. Years later in his memoirs, Confederate artillery prodigy Porter Alexander called Hooker’s plan, “Decidedly the best strategy conceived in any of the campaigns ever set foot against us.” Alexander also praised the execution of the plan as,“Excellently managed,”adding,“up to the morning of May 1st.” [3.95.233.107] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 10:55 GMT) Chancellorsville, April—June 1863 81 My position at...