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Chapter Five: Mud, Morale, and Monotony, January–April 1863
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65 Chapter F ive Mud, Morale, and Monotony January—April 1863 The Army of the Potomac After the battle Burnside tried to regain the confidence of the army, and there is no doubt that Sumner did a good deal to help him. Burnside conceived the plan of crossing the Rappahannock a few miles above Fredericksburg, where the enemy were unprepared to receive us. The result was the “mud march” of January 20th—21st. It was Burnside’s effort to redeem himself. To start off in the mud as we did with the army in its discouraged state was perfect folly. There did not seem to be anything in the move to recommend itself . . . but it was a hazardous move, with the army out of confidence with its commander and the enemy elated with brilliant success. The general demoralization that had come upon us made two or three months of rest a necessity. —Major General Darius N. Couch, U. S. Army Eager for vengeance after the disaster at Fredericksburg, Burnside began exploring ways to recross the Rappahannock and launch a major assault against Lee’s army. He was motivated by three factors: he believed that after December 26, 1862, the Army of the Potomac had been sufficiently resupplied and had recovered from the fatigue they had experienced leading up to and at Fredericksburg ; the winter weather was unseasonably mild, hence, there was a window of opportunity to move troops and equipment in a favorable climate; and, finally, 66 Your Brother in Arms confidence and morale were sinking by the day in the Army of the Potomac among both officers and men, and in Burnside’s mind, a bold initiative would help reverse the downward spiral of the troops’ spirits. Before the offensive could begin, two politically connected brigadier generals (Newton and Cochrane) went to Washington to express their profound lack of confidence in Burnside’s ability to lead. Thanks to their ties with Radical Republicans and Cochrane’s friendship with Secretary of State William H. Seward, the two disgruntled generals were able to schedule an appointment with the president. Newton and Cochrane laid out a grim and pessimistic picture of a demoralized and vulnerable Army of the Potomac under Burnside’s leadership. Just as Burnside was ready to launch his offensive, Lincoln telegraphed him: Burnside was to “not make a general movement without letting me know of it.” Already sensitive about the growing discontent and lack of trust among his general officers, Burnside was furious that intriguers were poisoning his relationship with Washington leadership. An angry Burnside went as quickly as he was able to Washington to offer his resignation to the president. Lincoln, seeking to avoid turmoil that would negatively affect the entire Army of the Potomac, rejected Burnside’s offer but kept him on a short leash, limiting the general’s decision-making authority. As 1863 began General in Chief Halleck and the president encouraged Burnside to launch a new initiative based on their intelligence that Lee had dispatched a large number of his Virginia-based troops to reinforce the Carolina coast. The Confederate army, in Lincoln and Halleck’s view, was in a more vulnerable position than it had been since the battle at Fredericksburg. In response, on January 17, Burnside ordered his division commanders to move out toward two fords on the Rappahannock River, but then he delayed the march for three days in order to gather and assess intelligence on Confederate countermovements. Finally, on January 20, the Army of the Potomac was ordered to move out. It was unseasonably warm, and the army moved under blue skies filled with billowy cumulus clouds. You have no idea of how soon the roads turn from good to bad here in Virginia .A clayey soil is hard and the very best for marching on in favorable weather , but let it rain but an hour and troops and wagons march over the road, and the mud is worse than anyone who has not been in Virginia can conceive of. . . . It seems that Mud is really King. He sets down his foot and says, “Ye shall not pass,” and lo and behold we cannot. But Mud wields more despotic sway these last two days than ever I saw him wield before. The horses sank into mud up to their bellies. . . . —Lieutenant Theodore A. Dodge, 119th New York Infantry, January 22, 23, 1863 [44.213.80.174] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 05:22 GMT) Mud, Morale, and Monotony, January—April 1863...