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72 Chapter 6 Duty with Ike After French resistance in Northwest Africa ended, Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson’s forces began an advance on the night of November 24–25 from Algiers toward Tunis, some five hundred miles to the east. ULTRA had already revealed to Eisenhower that enemy reinforcements, arms, and supplies had begun arriving in Tunisia on November 10, and by “the time Anderson moved forward, both he and Eisenhower knew that an embryonic German occupation force had been improvised”and that the attack toward Tunis and Bizerte would not be as easy “as it would have been even a few days earlier.”1 At first Anderson’s forces encountered rather light resistance, but by the twenty-eighth German opposition had increased considerably. Soon the advance bogged down completely, as heavy rains made the roads almost impassable , compelling Eisenhower to call off the attack on December 24. One factor that undoubtedly influenced Eisenhower’s decision to halt the advance was ULTRA intelligence indicating that Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander in chief, South, was pouring reinforcements and supplies, including a large number of tanks, into the Tunis area at a rapid rate. At the end of the year the Allied front in Tunisia extended some 250 miles from the coast west of Bizerte southward to just west of Gafsa.2 Truscott and Conway arrived in Algiers late Christmas Eve,where they learned that Admiral Darlan had been assassinated in the city earlier that day. They made their way to Eisenhower’s headquarters, only to find that the general was visiting the front in Tunisia and would not return until the next day. After spending the night in the Alletti Hotel, the two returned to Allied Force Headquarters early the following morning, anxious to learn if Eisenhower intended to give Truscott a combat command in North Africa or send him to the United States. At AFHQ Conway and he met with General Clark, Eisenhower’s deputy, and Maj. Gen. Walter B.“Beetle” Smith, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, with whom Duty with Ike 73 they shared their observations of the situation in French Morocco and along the Mediterranean front. Eisenhower did not return until late Christmas Day and postponed his meeting with Truscott until the following day. Eisenhower greeted Truscott warmly the next morning and told him that he would like him to remain in Algiers for a few days, explaining that he “was considering an operation, and if it materialized, he would have a job for [him].” Eisenhower explained that for the next few days he would be completely occupied in dealing with the aftermath of the Darlan assassination. When Truscott returned on the twenty-ninth, Eisenhower told him that he had been “terribly disappointed” that the Allied drive on Tunis had been stopped, and he had decided to postpone that attack indefinitely. However, during his visit to the front he had discussed with his subordinates the feasibility of mounting an operation farther south by the 1st Armored Division (AD) and an attached RCT from the 1st Infantry Division (ID) to cut Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s line of communications between Libya and Tunis. His staff had found such an operation to be practicable and believed that the forces could be assembled at Tébessa by January 22. To reduce his span of control Eisenhower planned to create an advance command post in Constantine adjacent to First Army Headquarters and proposed that Truscott become his deputy chief of staff there, to which Truscott agreed. He telephoned Patton in Casablanca to tell him of his new assignment, asked that he arrange for Carle‑ ton and the rest of his party to join him in Algiers the following day, and left for Constantine on January 1.3 As Truscott was establishing his command post at Constantine, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall’s II Corps headquarters opened there the first week of January . Fredendall’s staff immediately began planning to implement Operation SATIN, the seizure of Gabès or Sfax to cut the line of communications between Tunis and Rommel’s forces and, it was hoped, draw the German forces in the north southward, thus allowing General Anderson to resume his attack to capture Tunis when weather conditions improved. Eisenhower would exercise overall command of SATIN through Truscott in the advance command post, which formally opened on January 17 in the nearly empty American Orphanage.4 Fredendall’s plan was to attack eastward from the Friana-Gafsa area with the...

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