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103 6 Aisne-Marne I The follow-up of the battle of Soissons was the Aisne-Marne offensive, and the individual who had to advance the action of I Corps was Liggett; his instruments for advance were appallingly weak, namely, the Twenty-sixth Division and a French division. All this was under the command of Degoutte, a suitable enough general but no assistance in pushing Edwards, who was Liggett’s principal problem. Now and then the ambitious Colonel Mitchell would appear, hoping that he might become an air brigade commander, which would make him a brigadier general. He perhaps sensed that his own displays of resolution could handle anything, inspiring General Pershing at GHQ to keep him around. Liggett was reduced to shoving around Edwards, an enormous task because as mentioned, Edwards had learned in the Old Army how one could maneuver; he was a master at it. He believed he could outmaneuver Liggett in the latter’s position as corps commander with only one and one-half divisions, the bulk of which were Edwards’s troops. Thursday, July 18 Up at 3:30 and at headquarters at 4:30, when attack started. General Liggett in early afternoon advised Lassiter (in accord with his own view) against moving corps artillery forward except perhaps two pieces to go in by Crupon, on assumption, of course, that divisional artillery will follow up. Called on General Edwards at headquarters, Méry, and General Liggett gave him a memo of cautionary advice about counterattacks. General Liggett disapproved of plan advanced for taking Bouresches-Void, as the direct attack would be too costly and would in any event bring the Twenty-sixth ahead of the general line; if they wanted to put a company 104 In the Company of Generals in to infiltrate and keep contact, he had no objection. This plan was evidently the more comprehensive one—which they abandoned. General Liggett talked over the situation with Edwards and impressed upon him the duty of doing the assigned part and guiding on the left throughout the operation, but he told him that he might very properly help out Schmidt (One Hundred Sixty-seventh) on the left if he needed help in his task on the immediate left of the Twenty-sixth to the extent of a battalion or so and Edwards approved, intimating that he was all the more ready to do this as Schmidt’s task was clearly bound up with theirs, and I inferred that they had already talked the matter over in a general way. As to the corps reserve of one battalion, General Liggett consented to the substitution of a battalion in action today for the one held out today, the used battalion to become corps reserve; and he told Edwards in an offhand way that he might use it if he wanted it. Called on General Schmidt of One Hundred Sixty-seventh. The general told Schmidt that if he wanted help from Edwards for his operations around 193 his request to that effect would have his approval, the fair inference being that he could have help if he wanted it. Aisne-Marne I 105 In the evening General Degoutte called and thanked General Liggett for the assistance and successful performances of the Americans engaged , the Twenty-sixth and Fourth being in his army. He reported fine advances by Third and First Americans to Mount de Paris and south of Soissons, check of French about Choug and Neuilly-St.-Front. He was obviously disappointed, but considered it on the whole a good day. He plans a continuation of the exploitation for tomorrow, and at 10:30 General Liggett received a note giving H-hour as 4:00 a.m. Lassiter here on ammunition. General Liggett signs letter he dictates. Friday, July 19 Up at 3:15 and at office at 4:00 a.m. Exploitation resumed, but with less satisfactory results. Liaison officer, Captain Gray, here from French VII Army Corps (Massenet) to learn about present state of Schmidt’s line and his and the Americans’intentions respecting Hill 193. He was advised that Schmidt is about to attack 193 with two regiments, the Americans on Schmidt’s right assisting with covering machine-gun and rifle fire. A report came from Grant that the 52nd Brigade (Cole) had limited amount of assistance to machine-gun and protecting rifle fire and would give no units to Schmidt for attack, as they wished to conserve them for operations tomorrow. Barbour was excited...

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