The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan

Chapter 6. Conclusion

129 Chapter 6 Conclusion The findings of the preceding chapters shed new light on the process and outcome of the student movement of 1989 in Beijing. Overall, although cultural and historical traditions as well as idiosyncratic personality traits certainly shaped student behavior, it was the state that exerted the most profound influence on their strategies and actions. Specifically, the fear and distrust engendered by sustained single-party monopolization of state institutions , party–state domination of the media, party penetration of social organizations, and a high propensity for harsh state repression combined to create great organizational difficulties and impelled students to choose noninclusive mobilization strategies. Looking comparatively at the movement of 1990 in Taiwan, a similar pattern appeared. Throughout each movement, students were presented with various choices in strategy and behavior. However , the political environment at the time rendered certain options risky or unwise. Thus, although student behavior during both movements might appear to have been irrational or flawed, in reality the actions of the students were largely a natural response to the political realities they faced. Implications for Theories of Contentious Politics The notion that the state has a great influence over protest behavior and outcomes is not new; prominent theorists of contentious politics have argued the point for at least two decades. In The Contentious French, for example, Charles Tilly contends that French protest behavior shifted over time as a reaction to changes in the state.1 Similarly, in Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, Doug McAdam stresses that movement processes and outcomes are greatly influenced by the “structure of political opportunities” in which a protest group acts.2 More recently, Sidney Tarrow 130 • The Perils of Protest has traced variations in protest behavior due to the rise and subsequent demise of the nation–state as the primary locus of political power.3 These and other studies have provided path-breaking analyses of public protest, and their basic insights remain at the forefront of social movement theory. Yet these conclusions came from case studies found almost entirely in the liberal West. As a result, many have wondered whether or not current approaches provide an adequate understanding of the influence of the state in more illiberal and overtly repressive systems. With this question in mind, a growing number of scholars have begun to focus on protest in explicitly nondemocratic settings.4 This book extends this new wave of inquiry. It finds that certain protest traits are intensified in more illiberal and repressive environments. Specifically , as one moves across the spectrum toward more oppressive regimes, intervening variables of fear and distrust become exponentially more pronounced , such that the crucial collective action resources of organization and mobilization are stymied. In severely risk-laden settings, organization is hindered by the need for preexisting bonds of friendship to overcome distrust and fear, and a heightened tendency toward protest radicalization. When movement infiltration and repression are extremely likely, networks based on anything less than the most trustworthy connections tend to be characterized by internal suspicion, leading to organizational instability and ineffectiveness . In such a risky atmosphere, successful organization may be possible only when it is based on personal friendship networks (and thus the highest level of trust). Reflecting the assumption that all networks generally aid organizational development and strength, many scholars of 1989 portray the preexisting “democracy salons” at Beijing University as the building blocks of student organization during the movement.5 Yet the findings uncovered here indicate precisely the opposite: the preexistent groups at Beijing University fostered conflict and division within the student movement organization. Moreover, the first cross-campus organization was born, not at Beijing University, where many autonomous student groups had been functioning for a number of years, but at Beijing Normal University, where students had virtually no prior experience of autonomous organization. Similarly, in Taiwan the student movement groups that formed prior to the spring of 1990 did not serve to strengthen organization during the Month of March movement. Indeed, these previously existing groups often complicated the organizational process, creating conflict, division, and distrust. This finding seems counterintuitive. However, given the environment of fear that existed in both China and Taiwan, it becomes understandable. As Conclusion • 131 noted earlier, this negative atmosphere caused student leaders to trust only those with whom they were well acquainted prior to the movement. With regard to preexistent organization, this had two detrimental effects. First, although the autonomous groups founded prior to...