The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations

Chapter 5 The West Coast White House in San Clemente

An unresponsive prime minister I had ended the two initial meetings with Henry Kissinger on July 18 and 21 feeling nearly completely satisfied. First of all, I saw a clear agreement being reached on the establishment of a political hotline, which was my primary objective. Second, I had been able to elicit the opinion of President Nixon concerning Prime Minister Satò’s visit to the United States—namely, nothing would be done to make matters awkward for the prime minister. I was also delighted to have detected a positive outlook for a nuclear-free return of Okinawa. Still unresolved were Japan’s stance on prior consultation and the addition of a clause on a “nuclear-free” return, as well as the need for me to relay to the Americans the prime minister’s views on these matters in a month’s time. I was optimistic since it was my personal understanding that the difficulties involved were not insurmountable. Unfortunately, my elation was dampened after I returned to Japan, and on the morning of the 25th, starting at about 10:30 a.m., I met with Prime Minister Satò at his official residence for about two hours folChapter 5 The West Coast White House in San Clemente lowing the regular cabinet meeting. As usual, there was a considerable gap between my perceptions and those of the prime minister. I asked the prime minister to look through my Japanese translation of the memorandum that I had given to Henry Kissinger. I watched his reaction carefully, sensing that at this stage he was still not overly keen on the idea of establishing a formal political hotline between himself and President Nixon, despite having agreed that it was necessary in our meeting on the 10th. It may have been that he did not foresee how significant and valuable such a link could become, although he did express his particular gratitude for the information I had been able to gather during my time in Washington. I was particularly anxious that Satò, while recognizing the value of the connection to him as prime minister, would not view this new, top secret channel merely as one of a number of competing sources of information. Not surprisingly, I was not happy with his attitude. Having tried so hard to open up a direct channel of communication, I found it difficult to contain my irritation at the prime minister’s apparent obtuseness in failing to grasp the significance of the new connection. Admittedly, the prime minister had never explicitly requested me in so many words to open up such a channel. Even had he entertained such a wish, his natural disposition was to avoid taking explicit, exclusive responsibility for initiating particular courses of action. Moreover, his manner of speaking was anything but straightforward. Characteristically he spoke in a meandering, indirect, obscure manner, leaving one hanging in uncertainty , and on more than one occasion, I found myself trying to puzzle out his instructions long after a meeting. Satò had indeed agreed with my suggestion about the need for a political hotline, but he had also said he wanted me to proceed with caution. In reality, therefore, it may have been that I had run ahead of myself, and my disappointment might somewhat have reflected my own interests and preoccupations. In any case, having listened to my detailed report, the prime minister expressed his delight at learning that President Nixon was looking forward to his visit to Washington and would do nothing to embarrass him. Satò was unusually forthright in stating his belief that it would be possible to maintain good relations between Japan and the United States. He then added, I’m genuinely eager to proceed along the lines of a nuclear-free reversion. Special arrangements in the case of Okinawa would be hard to get away with. At the same time, I recognize that there may be times of emergency 120 West Coast White House in San Clemente when unrestricted use of the bases is in Japan’s interest. I have Korea, in particular, in mind, but it could in certain circumstances also concern Taiwan . To be honest, there were rumors at the time of the revision of the Security Treaty under the Kishi cabinet that Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama had signed a secret deal,1 and I want to avoid any such agreement . That sort of approach would, I feel, be meaningless given the way...