Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938

4 The Gaimushō’s Loss in the Manchurian Incident

The Gaimushò’s Loss in the Manchurian Incident 4 While the Gaimushò played a major role in enabling consular offices to be used as tools for Japanese imperialism in East Asia, the ministry also steadfastly maintained its identity as a diplomatic bureaucracy. Indeed, the Gaimushò’s insistence on perpetuating a consular function sanctioned by the international legal system precluded it from responding effectively to administrative changes in Manchuria. Unwillingly to radically alter consular duties, the Gaimush ò could not play along with the competing structures of Japanese authority in the field. The result was the increasing exclusion after September 18, 1931, of the Gaimushò from Manchuria, the region of China most coveted by Japanese imperialism in the prewar period. Akira Iriye has written of a consensus in Japanese leadership that emerged in the 1930s that the peaceful and economic diplomacy of the 1920s had ulimately brought no benefits to Japan. Rather, “what united the military, the nationalistic groups and the bulk of the intellectuals was the shared perception of the 1920s as a decade of futile attempts at peaceful expansion through international co-operation.”1 In the case of the Foreign Ministry, however, 118 The Gaimushò’s Loss in the Manchurian Incident this consensus came late, certainly after the Manchurian Incident, and many leading diplomats remained resistant to this view to the bitter end. Indeed, the very existence of the Gaimushò, as well as the authority (vis-à-vis other Japanese agencies) of its consular offices and other apparatus in China and Manchuria, was closely tied to Japan’s full participation in the world system of the 1920s and the ministry’s greater legitimacy in that system.2 Denial of the international system by emerging military, colonial, and bureaucratic leaders at home and in the field was tantamount to denial of the proper basis of the authority of the Gaimushò as well. This increasing trend, coupled with decades of struggle by competing Japanese agencies for greater authority in the field, undermined the prestige, influence, and raison d’être of the institution in the late 1920s and set the stage for the Manchurian Incident.3 Disunity of Japanese Jurisdiction in Manchuria, 1905–1928 The problems in Manchuria began with the acquisition of rights and privileges there following the Russo-Japanese War.4 The Japanese army’s tenacious hold over its occupied territory occasioned protest from Chinese statesmen and concerned Western powers.5 The first task of the Saionji cabinet, formed in January 1906, was to implement the open door in Manchuria and devise a policy for the region that would suit the international order. Opposition from the army, particularly from Chief of Staff Kodama Gentarò, was so strong that the conflict over Manchurian administration became the deciding factor in Foreign Minister Katò Takaaki’s resignation at the end of February.6 Saionji, however, now assuming Katò’s position as well as the prime ministership, persevered in pressing the military to concede to the reopening of Manchuria. By May 1, with the restoration of foreign consulates to their prewar sites in Manchurian cities, international opinion was mollified about the open door in Manchuria.7 Saionji himself traveled to Manchuria for several weeks in April and May on a tour designed to promote good relations with Chinese authorities and gather information for administrative plans. On May 22, 1906, following his return, the prime minister held the The Gaimushò’s Loss in the Manchurian Incident 119 first meeting of the Joint Council on the Manchurian Question (Manshû mondai kyògikai) to determine basic policy in the new sphere of interest. Itò Hirobumi, resident-general of Korea and a genrò leader, echoed Saionji in stressing the necessity for resolution of the conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the army and the need to maintain favorable relations with Western allies. Among other changes, he urged the rapid transfer of authority held by military administrators in greater Manchuria to the appropriate consuls, who rightfully held exclusive rights to negotiate with Chinese officials and manage Japanese civilians.8 Itò acted partly in response to a strongly worded letter from British Ambassador MacDonald protesting Japan’s continuing interference with Western merchant activity in Manchuria. Among other enterprises, “the attitude adopted by the Japanese authorities ” had caused “serious interference . . . both to the British sugar trade and to the silk industry at Chefoo [Zhifu].” Also, the British American Tobacco Company was repeatedly protesting that Japanese authorities did not allow the company...