Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan

2. Imperial Navy Planning and the Emperor

• 2 Imperial Navy Planning and the Emperor Japanese critics of Hirohito and the “emperor system” have long pointed out his obvious legal responsibility as official chief of state and commander in chief of the armed forces.1 The Meiji Constitution, promulgated in 1889 and in force until shortly after the end of the war, made the emperor of Japan a living god—the pinnacle of the spiritual and political hierarchy. It is absurd, therefore, to argue against his legal responsibility for Japan’s aggression in China and the Pacific.2 Apologists for Hirohito emphasize his function as a constitutional monarch. They argue that practically speaking he knew little about the plans or operations of the army and navy—and in any case was in no position to resist their proposals. His role was to sanction, as a constitutional figurehead, what was laid before him. He was not expected to approve or disapprove policies as a political ruler participating in the decisions of state.3 Friendly chroniclers of Hirohito’s reign also allude to the influence of Prince Saionji Kimmochi, the last elder statesman (genrò), and Count Makino Nobuaki, Hirohito’s first political adviser. Makino will be treated extensively here, and there are a number of studies of Saionji. Although Saionji and Makino were staunch supporters of constitutional monarchy, a careful comparison of sources shows that prior to August 1945 neither the emperor, the prince, nor Makino was content with the purely ceremonial role of a constitutional monarch. This can Imperial Navy Planning and the Emperor • 13 be seen not only during the famous officers’ revolt of 26 February 1936 but on numerous other occasions.4 After the war the supreme commander of the occupation forces, General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), in order to facilitate the occupation, promoted the assumption that Emperor Hirohito had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. According to MacArthur, Hirohito was a figurehead monarch whose only military functions were ceremonial— riding about in a field marshal’s uniform on a white horse to inspire his subjects and pro forma signing plans for sending them to war. This explanation has been accepted by many Japanese and Western authors and rejected by a few. But the polemics employed by most have clouded rather than clarified the issue.5 In this chapter I will show that the emperor was indeed deeply involved in the war effort. He was well informed about the Imperial Navy’s plans, for example, including the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. Moreover, contrary to accepted assertions about Hirohito’s education, his conduct during this period was consistent with Sugiura’s imperial ethics and Shiratori’s oriental history: the emperor acted in the interests of first promoting and then preserving the Japanese national polity with the imperial house at its center. Hirohito’s Personal Views Not long after Japan’s surrender Hirohito described his situation in prewar Japan: It goes without saying that the war was unavoidable. Concerning the war, [We] attempted somehow to avoid it. I thought until totally exhausted; played every hand that was to be played. Even though I did everything in my power [to avoid hostilities], in the end my efforts were to no avail, and we plunged into war. This was indeed regrettable. With respect to this conflict, as I mentioned recently in a general way, the war came to an end because I stopped it. Because I did this a debate has arisen about why the war was not stopped before it began. Indeed , this argument seems logical. It sounds reasonable in some ways. However , this could not be done. Needless to say, our country has a constitution. Strictly speaking the emperor must act in accord with the provisions of the constitution. According to the constitution, responsibility for state affairs is borne by the ministers of state who are vested with due authority. The emperor is not allowed to willfully meddle, interfere, or intervene in the areas of responsibility of the ministers of state specified in the constitution . Therefore, with respect to internal affairs and foreign relations, there are persons designated by the constitution who are charged with carefully deliberating and formulating policy. If they do this, present the policy in accord 14 • Hirohito and War with the regulations, and request that it be approved (saika), whether I am satisfied with it or not there is no way around agreeing and approving it.6 Grand Chamberlain Fujita Hisanori (1880...