The Fountainhead of Chinese Erotica

3. Desire in the Ming Dynasty

39 3 Desire in the Ming Dynasty Now, nature is that which is formed by Heaven; the disposition is the substance of nature; and desire is the proper response of the disposition. To seek what desire deems attainable is that which the disposition certainly cannot avoid. —Xunzi, “The Recti¤cation of Names,” 22.694 Is the Ruyijun zhuan a precursor of radical philosophies that appeared during the latter part of the sixteenth century? Writers like Li Zhi (1527–1602), the most famous exponent of the iconoclastic style associated with the Taizhou school of Neo-Confucianism, argue that spontaneous, individual experience is more important than the pronouncements of sages or the study of books.1 Traditional conceptions of the self are too rational, conservative, and constrained. Human desires, even sexual satisfaction, no longer impede the pursuit of enlightenment: the exploration of human sexuality now happily assists in that pursuit. While the graphic descriptions found in the Ruyijun zhuan might at ¤rst seem to celebrate the unfettered expression of human desire, there is reason to be skeptical. And while we cannot assess the purpose of these descriptions merely by examining the intellectual history of the era, tracing contemporary developments in philosophy and ¤ction will help us to place them in a larger context that contributes signi¤cantly to their appraisal. New Developments in Contemporary Philosophy In the ¤rst few decades of the sixteenth century, just before the Ruyijun zhuan was written, a revolution in Chinese philosophical thought began. The rationalistic Neo-Confucianism of Cheng Yi (Cheng Yichuan, 1033– 1107) and Zhu Xi—thinking that had dominated the Chinese intellectual 40 Context and Analysis landscape since the twelfth century—had, in the opinion of many, deteriorated into frivolous scholasticism. Since 1313 their interpretations of the classics had been considered of¤cial state doctrine, and in 1415 their commentaries on the Four Books and the Five Classics were made the basis of the of¤cial examination system.2 But their philosophy had been regarded as of¤cial state doctrine for hundreds of years and its original character had become obscured. To its critics, the Neo-Confucianism of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi was no longer a standard for moral action but a tool for obtaining power, prestige, and wealth through the examination system. Far from being a method of attaining enlightenment, it had become an obstacle. Neo-Confucianism during the sixteenth century shifted the focus from the study of ancient texts and external phenomena to examination of the self. Society and the world were to be understood through an investigation of human nature and one’s own mind. In a way that sometimes borders on tautology, the mind was also considered the ultimate authority. The school of Wang Yangming (Wang Shouren, 1472–1529) dominated the debate during his lifetime and remained in¶uential for at least a century thereafter .3 Wang Yangming attacked the philosophy of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. He questioned whether their emphasis on textual criticism and the study of external phenomena contributed to the moral foundation of the individual. In Wang Yangming’s opinion, education had degenerated into a ritual of memorization, recitation, ¶owery composition, and argumentation. Contemporary philosophy was devoted to useless super¤cialities, he charged, its eloquence disguising the fact that it was empty, false, and unnatural.4 Wang Yangming brought new vitality to the philosophical debate. The task of the individual, he contended, was not to study external phenomena or classical texts but to identify with the innate principle of nature found in one’s self. Zhu Xi’s objective investigation of things (gewu) was inverted: the mind was not to be devoted to external things; the study of external phenomena results in the fragmentation of thought. The pursuit of true knowledge must be an internal search that depends on the extension of individual moral consciousness (liangzhi). Truth is not a set of doctrines but a personal experience. As many have noted, Wang Yangming’s philosophy is not the investigation of things (gewu) but the investigation of the mind (gexin).5 Often he was pressed by his students to provide further detail, but Wang Yangming usually turned the question back upon the student: for each person it is different and thus impossible for another to explain. Wang Yangming’s emphasis on the role of personal intuition and experience makes his philosophy highly subjective. But this is not to say it is without standards or that everyone is expected to rely on his own understanding of morality. Ideally...