Ending the LDP Hegemony

6. Successes and Failures of the Opposition Parties

6 Successes and Failures of the Opposition Parties 155 Superficial evidence seems to suggest that the Japanese opposition has utterly failed. The LDP ruled Japan for thirty-eight uninterrupted years, until 1993, and it returned to power in 1994, reconstructing its parliamentary majority in 1997. Hrebenar (1986, 83) presents succinctly the common stereotype of opposition failure and incompetence. With regard to the Socialist Party, he states, “Many Japanese regard it as poorly organized, indifferently led, narrowly based, doctrinaire and irresponsible in policy, lacking in autonomy, poor in human talent, and overly prone to ideological and factional division.” Hrebenar’s statement is based on the common explanations for opposition failure—poor leadership and ideological rigidity. The growing school of rational-choice literature on Japan reaches a similar conclusion. Cox (1996, 1997; Cox and Niou 1994) explains LDP longevity in power by citing its relative electoral efficiency. The LDP’s greater access to resources allows it to better coordinate its electoral efforts than the opposition camp, thus winning more seats. Matthew McCubbins and Frances McCall Rosenbluth (1995) seem to agree. Though inefficient, LDP coordinative efforts seem to compare favorably with the even less efficient methods of the opposition camp. This school of analysis explains LDP success by looking at the institutions and resources available. I present a contrasting view of opposition efforts. Opposition parties repeatedly came close to facilitating a breakup of the LDP in the 1970s and 1980s. They cooperated in elections to win seats from LDP candidates . In 1993, their support was crucial in the Ozawa-led defections from the LDP. Since 1993 these parties have gained influence on legis- lation, and their members have served in cabinet posts and as prime minister. The parties have increased their contacts with the bureaucracy, and they are regular and consistent players in legislative discussions. Opposition politicians have recast their popular image and created new parties. They now reach out to, and receive, the support of a much broader cross-section of the electorate. These two characterizations of the opposition seem contradictory, yet the difference can be reconciled by correctly identifying the goals the opposition was pursuing. If the only goal of the opposition was to increase its share of the electorate so as to become a parliamentary majority, then the conclusion that it failed, and failed starkly, is indeed inescapable. However, if analysts recognize the multiple goals of the opposition, then it becomes possible to see areas where the opposition achieved its goals, though it did not wrest power from the LDP. The designation of goals or standards by which performance is measured is crucial. In campaigns, for example, the battle over such measuring sticks is vital to the success of a candidate. Campaign staff in the United States will try to lower expectations before a debate or a primary election so that even a mediocre performance can be claimed a “victory.” Thus a candidate might say that coming in second in a certain primary will be a “victory” because of the large advantage of the opponent in that state. If the candidate can persuade the media to use his or her standard, then a second-place finish will be touted as a victory, and the candidate will gain momentum. In a similar but more disinterested manner, the standard by which the efforts of the Japanese former opposition parties are judged should be closely examined. These parties did achieve their goals, if their goals are allowed to include such things as enticing divisions within the LDP, reformulating the opposition parties, gaining legislative access, and maximizing seat shares through interparty cooperation. It is true that the opposition lost every election from 1948 to 1989, a sobering record of defeat. Focusing on only these defeats, though, obscures the more interesting story of the opposition’s efforts and successes. A Rational-Choice Perspective on Events The two competing stereotypes of the opposition, and their reconciliation , can be restated from a rational-choice analytical perspective. The opposition parties’ goals have been to increase their seats in the Diet and to take control of government. However, they have repeatedly failed to 156 Ending the LDP Hegemony take power from the LDP, and they have failed to make the changes necessary to take power. Two of the proffered explanations for these failures , that the opposition politicians were complacent or that they were too consumed with petty ideological jealousies, would seem at face value to be evidence...