Ending the LDP Hegemony

5. Party Cooperation and Strategies of Party Reorganization

5 Party Cooperation and Strategies of Party Reorganization 123 In 1970, a Japanese journalist wrote an account of the events surrounding the formation of the two coalition governments of 1947–1948, which included the Socialist Party. Unfortunately, the author could find no publisher for his work. At that time, there was little interest in two brief coalition governments of the late 1940s, coalition governments that seemed to have been aberrations, given the long, uninterrupted rule of the LDP and its conservative predecessors. Interest in the manuscript rose, however, with the LDP’s loss in the 1989 House of Councillors election. Coalition governments then seemed a possibility , and the revival of the Socialist Party made a study of its only period in power especially relevant. The manuscript was published in 1990 (Matsuoka 1990). Similarly, the various opposition plots to seize power from the LDP, to split the LDP, or to join with the LDP have not been the subject of scholarly attention or analysis. The machinations of an ostracized, largely irrelevant opposition, though interesting, did not seem particularly noteworthy , given the strong rule of the LDP and the need to better understand the LDP’s complex processes of decision making and governing practices. Events of the late 1980s and the 1990s have likewise changed these attitudes. The story of coalition building in the postwar period gives a historical context to the events of the 1990s. More important, this story sheds light on Japanese party relations, on opposition failure and success , and on the likely success or failure of future coalition governments. As with the elections described previously, each of the events described in this chapter is full of specific, idiosyncratic factors that defy general- ization. My analysis acknowledges this rich contextual knowledge while distilling out important patterns and commonalities. Common Themes Four themes emerge from the history of coalition efforts. First, the splitting of the LDP and the creation of a non-LDP coalition government, along with proposals for electoral reform and for reducing the influence of money in politics, all have their roots in the coalition efforts of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Plots and schemes similar to those of the 1990s were ubiquitous throughout the postwar period. The strategies of 1993 were not created in a vacuum; rather, they were the final fruition of one of these many nascent plans. The Socialists’ coalition with the LDP in 1994, and their support of an LDP minority government after the 1996 elections, also have rich historical precedents. Second, though the number of cases is small, the evidence suggests that governing coalitions follow the same essential numerical logic that electoral coalitions follow. The opposition parties vacillate among the three available strategies: building a party unilaterally, working toward an opposition coalition government, or jockeying for position as the junior member of an LDP coalition government. When the LDP has a bare parliamentary majority, or when the LDP is facing an election in which it could likely lose its parliamentary majority, talk of coalitions , defections, and party reformulations is common. When the LDP is ascendant and strong, such plans are shelved, and opposition parties concentrate on building their own bases or on cooperating electorally to reduce the LDP majority. Coupled with this numerical logic is the logic of personal ambition. LDP politicians who had lost a battle for power within the LDP were prime candidates for defection proposals, because they were considering all options to increase their power. Therefore, the prime time for discussing LDP defections was when the LDP faced both an election in which it might lose its majority, and some powerful losers from an internal leadership battle. A third lesson to be learned from this history of coalition efforts is the relative success that the opposition has had in bringing the LDP to a vulnerable position and exploiting splits in the LDP to their advantage. Just as the LDP exploits divisions within the opposition camp, the opposition can and does exploit factional divisions within the LDP. The failure of the opposition to bring any of its schemes to fruition does not negate 124 Ending the LDP Hegemony its successes in bringing the LDP to the brink of chaos on multiple occasions. Last, this chapter illustrates well the bargaining advantage that is the key to LDP success in staving off the opposition challenge. When party relations are fluid and interchangeable, the LDP enjoys the great advantage of playing off the...