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2. The Soviet Faction under Attack
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26 2 The Soviet Faction under Attack in north korea the ¤rst attempt to react to the new, uncertain, and potentially menacing international situation occurred in 1955. Before then the North Korean leadership had generally ignored the unfolding de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union. However, by the end of 1955 attempts at a response began, and the initial actions from Pyongyang did not bode well for those who either hoped for an eventual liberalization of the regime or simply wanted to follow the Soviet line. The events of late 1955 indicated that North Korea would distance itself from its main benefactor and aid donor. The ¤rst manifestation of this tendency was a campaign directed against some of the more prominent members of the Soviet faction, although that faction was probably not seen as the sole source of danger. In the North Korean political world, ridden with factional antagonism, any “other” was a source of danger, and Kim Il Song was aware of this. As the purge of Pak Il-u and the attacks on Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik testify, Kim did not exactly love the “Chinese Koreans” either, but the situation in late 1955 obviously made the Soviets more dangerous, because they could become a fulcrum for local reformism. I suggest that Kim Il Song’s decision to do something about the Soviet faction and its political role in North Korea was almost certainly in¶uenced by the unfolding de-Stalinization in the USSR. This process not unexpectedly troubled the young North Korean leader, who was only forty-four years old in 1956. Like other Communist countries, The Soviet Faction under Attack 27 North Korea had a political and social system closely modeled on the Stalinist system, and the personality cult of Kim Il Song—the cult of “the little leader”—had been patterned after the cult of “the big leader,” Stalin. The Stalinist in¶uence was also evident elsewhere, from an industrial policy with an emphasis on heavy industry to the ¤ne arts and the show trials of fellow Communists. Hence any diminution of Stalin’s prestige spelled grave danger for Kim Il Song’s own authority. Kim had good reason to fear that his rivals would employ the “little leader, big leader” analogy to accuse him of establishing his own personality cult, as subsequent developments in Korea (the August Plenum) and some other Communist countries would reveal. In many places, local “little Stalins” were ousted by political rivals (Bulgaria), popular protest (Hungary ), or both (Poland). By 1955, Kim Il Song and his entourage, the former Manchurian guerrillas, had many reasons to feel uneasy about the new situation, and it is likely that they perceived the Soviet faction as a major threat to their authority. After the Korean War, approximately 150 Soviet Koreans held important positions in the North Korean Workers’ Party and government. Once they had been key political players, had enjoyed the backing of the omnipresent Soviet military, and up to the early 1950s had exceeded any other group in in¶uence and power. By 1955, however, the in¶uence of the Soviet faction had weakened somewhat; the gradual promotion of former guerrillas and other people who were perceived as personal supporters of Kim Il Song had been implemented at the expense of other groups. It is likely that Kim Il Song and his inner circle had never really felt much sympathy toward Soviet Koreans, but it was the continuing de-Stalinization in the USSR that made the Soviet faction look especially dangerous. Maintaining close connections with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Koreans were easily in¶uenced by the “Soviet spirit”—a more liberal in¶uence than the in¶uence of Mao’s regime over the Yan’an faction. From Kim Il Song’s point of view, the Soviet Koreans were more likely to raise ideas of reform, to criticize his personality cult, or otherwise to cause trouble. By late 1955, Kim Il Song was working out a strategy for the next phase of his struggle for absolute supremacy, beginning by targeting the Soviet faction. It is not clear whether his real aim was to eliminate the Soviet faction or merely [3.235.130.73] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 20:39 GMT) 28 Crisis in North Korea to check its in¶uence and teach potential troublemakers a lesson, but the latter possibility seems more likely. The new policy that slowly began to be implemented in 1955 seems to have been not only a reaction...