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59 7 Formation of the Indonesian State Because a successful interrelation between Islam and the state depends largely on the extent to which shari‘a is implemented by the state, fierce discussions on whether Indonesia as a modern nation-state should implement shari‘a for its Muslim citizens emerged during the months prior to Indonesia’s independence on 17 August 1945. Many studies have focused on the perspective of Muslim nationalists as opposed to secular nationalists and have put aside the conceptions of state offered by both camps.1 This chapter, therefore, will discuss the same subject but with a particular emphasis on the concepts of the unitary state and the so-called fragmentary state. The chapter posits that there has been an ongoing contest between efforts to implement the unitary state ideal and attempts to turn Indonesia into a fragmentary state since the first years of Indonesia’s independence. It now seems, however, that the latter model may be more politically successful. ‘Unitary State’ vs.‘Fragmentary State’ Before going any further, let me explain what I mean by ‘unitary state’ and ‘fragmentary state.’ The former refers to a vision of Indonesia shared by most of the founding fathers2 as a “state which neither fuses itself with the largest group in society nor allies with the strongest (political or economical) group, but [in fact] . . . transcends all groups, over individuals; it bonds all levels of society.”3 The ‘fragmentary state’ is understood as the exact opposite of the unitary state, that is, a state that links itself to the largest group of the country’s population by offering degrees of autonomy either to particular religious communities or regions. The discussion of the state format for a new Indonesia began seriously when the Japanese occupation promised Indonesia independence several months before August1945.AlthoughtheJapanesehadgivenaprivilegedpositiontoIslamduring their occupation,4 there was no clear plan for the Japanese to initiate the establishment of a new state colored by a strong religious sentiment. As far as the position of Islam in the new Indonesia was concerned, the Japanese authorities, as described 60 Chapter 7 by Benda, “have not the slightest blueprint or plan concerning the place which the Islamic religion should occupy in the government, or what the relationship should be between Islam and other religions.”5 The Japanese claimed only to facilitate the efforts of Indonesian people to realize their own goal of founding the new state. However, it was suspected that the Japanese were likely to back the secular ideas propounded by the nationalists during the decolonization period.6 In early 1945, there was already hot debate over the character of the future Indonesian state between Islamic and nationalist leaders in the Sanyo Kaigi (Advisers Council), an official body of the Japanese government. According to Lev, the Gunseikanbu (military administration headquarters) was curious to know what was Sanyo Kaigi’s vision regarding the relationship between religion and the state in an independent Indonesia, which promptly led to the polarization of competing ideologies between Muslims and nationalists. From February to April 1945, the focus of much of the discussion was on Muslim institutions, such as the status and jurisdiction of an Islamic court, the roles of the chief mosque administrator (kepala masjid), and whether penghulu (the Islamic religious official) would continue to counsel the first instance of the ordinary courts and remain adviser to the heads of regencies (bupati).7 Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, the leader of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), advocated that Islamic courts not only must remain—he took this for granted—but should also be strengthened through the provision of better-educated and government-paid judges. Moreover, their original jurisdiction over inheritance, which was transferred to the state court in the Dutch colonial period, should be restored. Above all, Abikusno not only defended the formal existence of the Islamic religious advisers, but also “argued forcefully for granting the Islamic umma its full due, which amounted to something very close to an Islamic state.”8 For Abikusno and other Muslim leaders, Islam could only survive and grow stronger and be fulfilled as a religion if it had the state behind it. Meanwhile, although Mohammad Hatta, the secular nationalist9 and the first vice president, welcomed the existence of kepala masjid and penghulu, he was not in favor of the Islamic courts. Apparently, Hatta felt it was sufficient to have all cases tried by an ordinary court, which could seek the advice of penghulu. In fact, Hatta also did not support the...

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