The Making of the First Korean President: Syngman Rhee's Quest for Independence, 1875-1948

Chapter 6. Fall from Power in Shanghai and Hawai‘i

131 cHAPTeR 6 Fall from Power in Shanghai and Hawai‘i Rhee’s Rivals in Beijing and Shanghai Syngman rhee decided to hold firm as president of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) rather than give in to calls for his resignation, a decision that preserved much-needed constancy in the government’s leadership , but only at the cost of continued challenges to rhee’s authority. For the most part, these challenges originated from four political adversaries, each of whom labored in one way or another to have rhee ousted from the presidency during his stay in China from December 1920 to may 1921. as rhee may well have expected before setting foot on Chinese soil, his longtime friend turned political nemesis, Pak Yong-man, was to be a source of considerable resistance. Kim Kyu-sik, another former ally whom rhee had fallen out with, would also work to undermine rhee’s ability to carry out his presidential duties. But the primary sources of contention and willful defiance were Yi tong-hwi, who had powerful connections both with the Soviets and with influential Koreans inclined toward communism , and an Ch’ang-ho, who drew support from expatriate communities in the continental United States, Hawai‘i, mexico, Siberia, and China (Fig. 6.1). By this point in his political career, rhee was adept enough to avoid being blindsided. From conversations, reports, political statements, and rumors, he was able to piece together his suspicions and act accordingly. In particular, Yi tong-hwi’s resignation from the premiership of the Shanghai Provisional Government in January 1921 alerted rhee to the possibility of coordinated activities against his presidency, and it was after this that rhee began using his own allies and resources to keep a much closer eye on the political maneuverings of Yi, as well as Pak, Kim, and an. rhee had left two of his most trusted friends, Sŏ Chae-p’il (Philip Jaisohn) and Chŏng Han-gyŏng (Henry Chung), in charge of the Korean Commission in Washington, D.C., during his absence, and he sent a series of confidential letters to both men between January and July. these letters offer a clear insight into just how much rhee was able to discern of the political turmoil around him. Excerpts from these letters show that he was able to garner plentiful information about his adversaries, though it 132 ChaPter 6 was ultimately up to rhee to separate fact from half-truth, hyperbole, and misdirection. What follows is a closer look at the four men who opposed rhee in Beijing and Shanghai, as well as rhee’s perception of each of them as reflected in his private letters to Sŏ and Chŏng. PAKYong-MAn as discussed in the last section of chapter 5, rhee had the misfortune of seeing his dear friend and sworn brother, Pak Yong-man (1881–1928), become a political antagonist and personal rival. the events surrounding their falling out occurred in Hawai‘i in 1915, after which Pak distanced himself from rhee’s sphere of influence. In July 1919, Pak turned up in vladivostok after being appointed minister of foreign affairs by both the Shanghai and the Hansŏng provisional governments the previous april. In 1920 he was on the move again, this time to China. His destination was Beijing, but he stopped off in Shanghai in late march and early april to confer with an Ch’ang-ho, the acting premier cum minister of the interior of the Shanghai Provisional Government. On april 3, Pak confided to an that he no longer wanted to serve (under President rhee) in the Shanghai Figure 6.1. Yi Tong-hwi, Syngman Rhee, and An Ch’ang-ho, featured in the New York Times Book Review and Magazine on June 26, 1921. Fall from Power in Shanghai and Hawai‘i 133 Provisional Government. Instead, Pak wished to use the knowledge and skills he had acquired as the founder of the military School for Korean Youth in Nebraska and the Korean National Brigade in Hawai‘i to continue working toward military solutions to the Korean problem. Presumably, Pak felt he would be able to use his contacts among Korean groups in the United States and the Far East to unify Korean expatriates militarily and create realistic combative strategies to wrest the Korean Peninsula from the hands of the Japanese. though it is not certain to what degree an sympathized...