Trust: Who or What Might Support Us?

1. Trust

9 o n e Trust The philosophical literature on trust is not abundant. One of the reasons might lie in the fact that trust cannot be displayed, observed, or presented as a thing. A second reason is that trust, as a peculiar relation between someone and a trusted person or impersonal reality (an institution or machine, for example) cannot be described as the relation between a subject and an object. Although trust certainly involves me in a relation with someone or something—thus involving me also in the trusted other’s existence—this involvement cannot be reduced to an “objective” relation, if the word object indicates that a certain reality can be displayed or presented as something over there, showing up for a freestanding subject, who perceives it from a distance . A trusted reality cannot be characterized as a “direct object” in the accusative; its appearance shows more likeness with a dative. a first approach I use the word dative to indicate a particular relation of a human subject to some reality that cannot be described as lying over against or 10 Varieties of Trust and Distrust in front of the subject who looks at it or puts it there and treats it at will. Dative is a specific form of the more generic case commonly called indirect object. A dative relation occurs when, for example, I give you a book or when I tell you a story. However, the word dative should neither be understood in a very literal and narrow sense, as if it only signifies a donative—giving or granting—relation, nor in a very wide sense that makes it almost indistinguishable from all other relations between a subject and some other reality. In many languages, the distinction between a dative and an accusative or directly objective (or objectifying) relation, is clearly marked by different cases. It is very important for an accurate phenomenology of a particular class of rapports without which no one can live. In this and the next chapter, I will attempt to clarify several properties of the dative structure and the effects it has on the person and things that are involved in it. This chapter introduces trust as one of the activities that have a dative structure, without insisting on the differences between trusting persons and trusting anonymous realities, such as tools, things, food, plants, the elements, meteorites, and so on. Chapter 2 will give an elementary analysis of the way in which the general structure of trusting another person is concretized in the phenomenon of entrusting, whereas chapters 3 through 5 extend our consideration to other realities and domains, including impersonal and inanimate ones. Thereby it will become apparent how involvement in relations of trust affects the trusting and the trusted parties in their modes of being. The relevance of trust for the performance of human existence will thus become obvious. Before I try to distinguish and classify various kinds of trusting and being trusted, however, let us start with a simple example. When I trust you, this does not mean that I observe, study, analyze, manipulate , or contemplate you from a freestanding perspective or that I subject you to any plan or activity. Instead, by trusting you, I become involved in a kind of bonding with you. Trust creates a kind of participation between you and me, and this changes my life, including my feeling, working, and thinking, at least in some aspect and to a certain extent. My trust in you involves me in one or more aspects of your life and activity; it associates me with you and gives you a role in my Trust 11 way of dealing with the world. Consequently, your life becomes a part of my life, at least in certain respects. If, on the contrary, I distrust you, I will keep a cautious distance and protect myself against your interference. When you are aware of my trust or distrust toward you, you hardly can avoid reacting to this fact. My attitude may influence your behavior , but you can, of course, refuse to get in contact with me. Such a refusal is then an answer, but a negative one. If you accept my trust, however, we are linked. This does not necessarily mean that you trust me—perhaps you don’t—but you are then somehow related to me and a mutual involvement emerges, which contains an invitation to...