Conversations on Peirce: Reals and Ideals

Seven Peirce on Interpretation

seven peirce on interpretation Carl R. Hausman  Our conversations concerning Peirce’s notions of perception and perceptual judgment led directly to considerations of judging and reasoning in the process of inquiry. For Peirce all reasoning—including inferencing and perceptually judging—involves interpreting, and it is this that is the focus of the present chapter. In an earlier chapter I examined the metaphysical implications of Peirce’s dynamical or dynamic object; in this chapter I will consider its import for Peirce’s conception of interpretation. Interpretation , for whatever purpose, relates a referent or a dynamic object, that which is to be interpreted, to the interpreter. What sort of relation is this and what constraints contribute to the process of moving from referent to interpretation? This question signals a topic that concerned Peirce not only in his semeiotic but also in his philosophy in general. I would like to extend some of the claims I have made elsewhere about ways to answer the question. I will propose an interpretation of how a Peircean approach suggests a way to mediate between {  } peirce on interpretation  two apparently opposing views. One view is the postmodern claim that interpretation creates its referent or object; the other view leans toward a kind of realism, that is, a qualified affirmation of a condition that constrains and thus limits the power or hegemony of interpretation over its object. It seems incontrovertible that assumptions and funded experience influence interpretation. In science, these presupposed conditions include accepted theories, axioms, discussions with colleagues, and whole networks of thoughts about which scientists generally agree. In the arts, these conditions include accepted prior interpretations that inform art historians and art critics. I believe that the same claim can be made about literary interpretations and about interpretations of music. In addition, the presuppositions include acknowledged as well as tacit prejudices or biases about what is to be expected in a culture. Frameworks of assumptions with which interpreters approach their objects, however, do not make up all that influences interpretations . Applying some of Peirce’s insights, I will try to show how an aspect of the object to be interpreted functions as a condition that is partially independent of prior assumptions and the process of interpretation . There is objectivity attributable to this aspect of the object. Thus, an objective factor acts as a condition that interacts with the assumptions and that provides constraints on the interpreter. Since I intend to get underway with the help of what I take to be Peirce’s central semeiotic, I must mention some key ideas in his terminology . In doing so, however, I will also initiate a transition into my proposal concerning the way constraints are not reducible to the interpreter’s imposition on the referent. What the interpreter brings to the semeiotic process is a complex or system of previous interpretations of referents. As I noted previously, Peirce called the referent that is interpreted a dynamic or dynamical object, and the dynamic object as interpreted is called the immediate object. Thus, the assumed system that is brought to interpretation by the interpreter consists of immediate objects, that is, previous knowledge and suppositions. I take it that the interpreter brings not only previously known immediate objects but also memories of previous acquaintance with similar  carl r. hausman experiences and also consciously recognized and even unconscious prejudices and persuasions that have resulted from previous interpretations . Dynamic objects initiate interpretations. Let us return to a version of my earlier example: a spot appears on the horizon of the sea, catches an observer’s attention, and causes the observer to wonder what it is and thus to begin to interpret it. In the context of this semeiosis, the spot serves as the dynamic object. Suppose that the developing interpretation determines that the shape of the spot is that of a ship. What develops, then, is an immediate object—the dynamic object as interpreted, or in this case as being interpreted. Continued observation might lead to a different interpretation as the tide brings the spot closer. It may then appear to be a log rather than a ship. And a bit later when brought even closer, it might be interpreted as an unusually large mass of seaweed. Thus, a series of immediate objects develops during the semeiosis. At each stage, the dynamic object as interpreted has changed. Yet has the ‘‘thing’’ that initiated the interpretation , apart from or...