Crossover Queries: Dwelling with Negatives, Embodying Philosophy's Others

Notes

Notes Introduction 1. For an account of vanity as seeing all that is as though it were not, see Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 119–38. 2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1958), 181, 6.371. 3. Ibid., 6.372. 4. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1. All essays mentioned in the Introduction as written by myself are included in the present volume. 5. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, 121, 5.43. 6. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 17. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 19. 9. Ibid. 10. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 127. 11. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 14–15. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 1, 162–63. 14. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 128. 15. See Edith Wyschogrod, Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger and Man-made Mass Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), esp. chaps. 1 and 2. 505 16. Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. George Van Den Abeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 88–89. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., 96. 19. See Jean-Claude Beaune, ‘‘The Classical Age of Automata: An Impressionistic Survey from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century,’’ in Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part I, ed. Michel Feher, with Ramona Naddaff and Nadia Tazi (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 435–37. 20. This paragraph is an altered version of a paragraph in my article ‘‘Errant Concept in an Age of Terror,’’ in Strike Terror No More, ed. Don Berquist (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2002), 106–7. 1. Intending Transcendence 1. Inside/Outside was exhibited in a retrospective of Clemente’s art at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, from October 8, 1999, to January 9, 2000. Composed on handmade Pondicherry paper, 63 inches high and 164 inches wide, the work was completed in 1980. The locking of hands appears to be an ironic visual commentary upon the linked hands in the creation as well as the temptation and expulsion scenes of Michelangelo’s famous Sistine Chapel ceiling. For a reproduction of the work, see Clemente (Guggenheim Museum Publications, 1999), plate 115. 2. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 216. 3. Ibid., 87–88. 4. Ibid., 12. 5. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology , trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 151. 6. Rudolf Boehm, ‘‘Husserl’s Concept of the Absolute,’’ in R. O. Elveson, The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 183. 7. This interpretation, including that of nulla ‘‘re’’ indiget ad existendum, follows that of Rudolf Boehm in ibid., 181ff. 8. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Haffner Press, 1951), 294, writes: ‘‘If now we meet with purposive arrangements in the world and, as reason inevitably requires, subordinate the purposes that are conditioned to an unconditioned supreme, i.e. final purpose, then we easily see that . . . we are thus concerned not with a purpose of nature (internal to itself) . . . [but] with the ultimate purpose of creation. . . . It is only as a moral being that we recognize man as the purpose of creation [and have a ground for] regarding the world as a system of purposes.’’ 9. James G. Hart, in ‘‘A Précis of an Husserlian Philosophical Theology ,’’ in Essays in Phenomenological Theology, ed. Steven W. Laycock and 506 Notes to Pages 6–18 James G. Hart (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), sees the Absolute’s transcendence as different from the transcendence of the world and of the I-pole; it remains a single but dipolar principle (p. 141). 10. Boehm, in Elveson, The Phenomenology of Husserl, 199, suggests that the key question for Heidegger is ‘‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’’ whereas for Husserl it is ‘‘To what end is everything that is?’’ 11. See Jacques Derrida, ‘‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,’’ trans. Ken Frieden, in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 73–77. Hereafter cited in the text as DNT. In a subtle account of apophasis, Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago...