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Appropriating Westphal Appropriating Nietzsche Merold Westphal as a Theological Resource B R U C E E L L I S B E N S O N In pointing out that Friedrich Nietzsche can be rightly read as a ‘‘theological resource,’’1 Merold Westphal has done people of faith a great service: that is, he has read Nietzsche carefully and helped them truly hear Nietzsche ’s critique. The result is that Westphal has shown how useful Nietzsche can be for believers (Christians, of course, but not them alone) in thinking about their faith and theology.2 Although not uncritical of Nietzsche, Westphal has teased out the implications of Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity and made a forceful case for Nietzsche being all too often right. It is Nietzsche’s conception of suspicion that Westphal puts to such useful work. Citing Nietzsche’s claim that ‘‘it is [the philosopher ’s] duty to be suspicious these days, to squint as maliciously as possible out of every abyss of mistrust,’’3 Westphal makes the crucial distinction between suspicion as directed at one’s interests in holding a belief rather than directed at the belief’s truth value. With that distinction in mind, I want to examine the interests of religious believers of which we should be suspicious. Since Westphal gives us his most sustained analysis of Nietzsche in Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism,4 I will focus primarily on that text, using others to supplement it. While there are many things in Christianity of which Nietzsche is suspicious , three seem particularly important to his account: ressentiment, love, and pity.5 As will become apparent, I argue that true love of the other is the way to avoid both ressentiment and the false sort of pity that is itself a manifestation of ressentiment. Following Westphal’s lead, I will consider 61 examples of how ressentiment and perversions of pity and love are manifest in scripture and in the present age. As such, I want to expand upon and deepen Westphal’s analysis. But I want to go beyond Westphal’s analysis by considering what would count as appropriate manifestations of pity and love and, even more important, if and how ressentiment might be overcome. To that end, I will also be appropriating the thought of JeanLuc Marion, who well supplements Westphal’s thought. While it is impossible to put Nietzsche’s worries to rest, I do think it possible to argue that alternative interpretations of seemingly loving acts, for example, are equally as plausible as Nietzsche’s suspicious interpretations. That is not to say that suspicion is neither necessary nor undesirable. Rather, it is to say that suspicion is only a hermeneutical moment, one we desperately need but must eventually pass beyond. Yet, before simply diving into the labor of appropriation, a word concerning how it works and its propriety is in order. For appropriation is exactly the appropriate word for a significant portion of the philosophical work that Westphal has done. Quite simply, if Nietzsche can be rightly termed a ‘‘master of suspicion,’’ then I think we can safely say that Westphal is a ‘‘master of appropriation.’’ Given that the logic of appropriation is neither simple nor necessarily benign, it is worth considering exactly how Westphal appropriates and toward what end. Appropriation No doubt, the first question of any believer skeptical of the very project of appropriating from what many would consider the archrival of religion in general and of Christianity in particular would be the following one: what could a Christian possibly learn from Nietzsche? Let me provide an example of exactly that sort of question. I recently had the opportunity to participate in a blog on postmodernity and Christianity. My post (titled ‘‘What Is Postmodernism?’’) was the first of eight, and the very first response to it was: ‘‘If the philosophers you quoted were all either agnostic or in some cases virulently atheistic, what makes you think you can start with their presuppositions and produce a different result?’’ That I was merely using such philosophers to supplement rather than ground Christian thought was something the respondent completely overlooked. But it was the idea that borrowing from agnostic or atheistic philosophers was somehow inappropriate that was really central to his question. For that very reason, I replied: ‘‘Adapting/adopting from non-Christians/pagan/ atheistic philosophers is something that Christians have been doing since the early days of Christianity.’’6 In one important sense, Westphal is doing 62 Appropriating...

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