The Unpolitical: On the Radical Critique of Political Reason

Chapter 7: Law and Justice

c h a p t e r 7 Law and Justice On the Theological and Mystical Dimensions of the Modern Political Opposition of Mysticism and Asceticism Perhaps in no other place as in the interpretation of the role of mysticism in the modern political, Weber’s spirit of capitalism requires revision and study. A mystical type of religiosity (eine mystisch gewendete Religiosität) is in itself entirely reconcilable ‘‘with an eminent realistic sense of empirical data’’ (thanks precisely to its antilogocentric nature; Weber says: thanks to its rejection of dialectical doctrines) and with a rational conduct of life (rationale Lebensführung).1 For Weber, however, mysticism lacks the ‘‘positive evaluation of external activity’’ (Wertung), which in Calvinism goes as far as the exigency of a ‘‘sanctity of works elevated to system’’ and that constitutes the fulfillment of mundane duties as supreme ethical norm. Thus, mysticism, in Weber, appears to be entirely inherent to the general process of rationalization and radical disenchantment (Entzauberung) of traditional religiosity, but almost as initial dimension of the same process, its immature source. The Weberian interpretation regards the assertion of that absolute transcendence of God before all creatures, in whose framework is located the vocational calling (Berufsarbeit), the synthesis of work and vocatio, of which mysticism is not yet capable. The transcendence of mysticism is still improper, since what constitutes its essence is the real 173 174 Law and Justice penetration of the divine in the human soul and this possibility would necessarily devalue human activity. We are not concerned at this point with the critique of the historical and theoretical foundations of Weber’s interpretation of mysticism, but rather in determining, more accurately, on one hand, the reasons of the difference between mysticism and fully unfolded rational conduct and, on the other, why, in such difference, the mystical dimension does not occupy at all the place of a propaedeutic to the reformed effective faith (fides efficax , according to the interpretation given by Weber). And this still in two senses: in that of the substantial irreducibility of mysticism to Weber’s process of secularization, and in that, apparently opposite, of its irreducibility to a simple form of resolution from the mundane to immediate mystical union (unio mystica) devaluating mundane activity tout court. We propose the following hypothesis: not only does mysticism function as a permanent form of critique or opposition to reformed ethical norm, but it is also possible to understand this action on political grounds, or better, as political form. The formation of the modern political can be interconnected to a (reinterpreted) dimension of the mystic, and this, probably, throws new light on the entire question of the spirit of capitalism. Weber opposes mysticism, as world-rejecting, to innerworldly asceticism . However rational the behavior inspired by such a refusal may seem, it will never be able to conceive the world as a duty imposed to the ‘‘religious virtuous,’’ nor even the success of one’s own work as manifestation of divine blessing.2 Even mysticism orders and rationalizes, puts into form, but does not give way to that innerworldly asceticism whereby ‘‘the certainty of salvation is constantly confirmed by univocal rational actions . . . conform to principles and rules.’’ The typical mystic is not concerned with a systematic conduct to reach an external success, but with a method to free himself from worldly seduction and to reach the perfect union with the divine. This method can certainly function as shaping force of a community (of men living mystically), but these communities will not develop rational actions as such. They will not give life to worldly order founded on practical rationalism. In Weber, the dimension of the mystic is clearly confined either to the role of original method of the process of rationalization , or that of community survival, to the margins of the rationalization and substantially noninfluential for its development. Along these same lines also functions the relation prophecy-clergy (to which we will have to return), where the former ends up by being resolved in the process of systematization and rationalization of religious ethics, as revelation on which rational metaphysics and religious ethics, developed by the clergy, 175 Law and Justice rests. Prophecy appears, thus, as an extraclerical force destined, however, to legitimize the functions of a clergy, of a body of functions, rationally and methodically organized.3 And, still, the same is the case with the analysis of redemption...