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I N T R O D U C T I O N Understandings of Plato and a Feature of Truth-Seeking Thought To try to understand the nature of truth might seem a very arrogant undertaking —and in an important sense, it is. But while not all of us try to understand the nature of truth, we all live as though we have already succeeded in understanding it. We all have ideas of how truth works, and we all act on those ideas, often in active opposition to conflicting ideas of truth. It is perhaps less arrogant, then, and less irresponsible to try to understand the nature of truth and so open our understanding to criticism and correction by ourselves and others—rather than to act firmly on the basis of an understanding we also claim no one should even try to gain. As Plato’s dialogues show, he himself was very much aware of these alternatives. Plato carefully explored the nature of what he saw as truth and its importance for life. I try to show that whatever we may think of the particular truths he saw, nevertheless just his concern for truth, and the careful way that he showed to explore the nature of truth and its importance for life, carry over helpfully to the exploration of our own ideas of truth and its importance. And, as I argue in this book, the exploration of the nature of truth is itself part of the nature of truth. To try to understand Plato’s specific exploration of truth is therefore also already to try to understand the nature of truth and its importance for life. This book, then, even in the respects in which it deals specifically with Plato, is most importantly about the nature of truth, including the dimension of it that is the truth of individual and social life. As one central theme, I try to show that there is a certain contradiction in the nature of truth, and that this is perfectly in order: that we can conceive and live in the context of a plurality of standpoints, each with different standards for truth, while the truth of each is also entirely unaffected by the truth of the others. That is, I try to show that we can, and must, conceive the same truth as simply absolute in some contexts and relative in others. I   Introduction: Understandings of Plato discuss the relations and transitions between these contexts in detail. As another central theme, I try to show that precisely this coordination of mutually exclusive conceptions of truth allows us to establish truth without the traditional problems of circularity or infinite regress. And in the course of discussing these themes, I try to show that this contradiction in the nature of truth requires us to reunderstand not only the nature of truth but also, as a result, the nature of consistency, and so also of thought. While I try to show that Plato’s dialogues express the views I discuss here, I do so by first presenting, in Part I, a detailed framework that is only provisionally an account of the dialogues, although it is fully developed in itself. I turn to discuss the dialogues in a continuous way only in Part II. As I say in the Preface, while I believe that this framework is necessary to understanding Plato, I hope it will justify itself as having value in its own right, irrespective of whether it is accurate as an interpretation of his work. I aim, then, to present a way of thinking that, I argue, solves some contemporary problems, a way of thinking that I also believe Plato already presented. With that in mind, in this Introduction I present a short history of how Plato has been understood in order to locate my understanding in relation to it. Plato is often ironic, saying or doing one thing in order to say or do another very different and often directly opposed thing. His irony is usually understood to occur in the context of a nonironic doctrine about, or understanding of, or attitude toward the world and the place of people in it. A more subtle variant of this interpretation is that his nonironic doctrine, understanding , or attitude is presented by means of his ironies. In this second view his teaching is never stated in a way that is not at first misleading. His reason for doing this, it is argued, is that...

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