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11. Better a mischief than an inconvenience: ‘‘The saiyng self’’ in Spenser’s View of the Present State of Ireland The phrase ‘‘saiyng self’’ (sic) in my title comes from Nicholas Udall’s introduction to Erasmus’ Apophthegmes and refers to the individual apophthegm, or, as we would say, to ‘‘the saying itself.’’1 To a modern ear, Udall’s phrasing also suggests both the self or subject who speaks an apophthegm and the one who is culturally spoken by it, thereby expressing its mixed, unstable ownership and agency. The particular ‘‘saiyng self’’ of Spenser that I intend, ‘‘Better a mischiefe then an Inconvenience,’’ occurs strikingly twice in the first half of A View of the Present State of Ireland.2 This saying, whose glossing I deliberately postpone, stands out in a modern setting first because it is unfamiliar, but the formal and historical contexts in which it occurs in the View also draw attention. It may be the only proverb repeated in the View—at least it is the only repetition of one to catch my eye in numerous rereadings. First spoken by Spenser’s persona Irenius, it is curiously reiterated by Eudoxus, his other persona, some fourteen pages later, soon enough for notice even by the mnemonically challenged modern reader. But this saying also stands out as a prefabricated syntactical unit—an instance of that oddity the frozen syntagm—and it is further notable as an instance of the popular rhetorical figure paroemia, the sort of figure that Renaissance editions flagged for emphasis and mnemonic reference with an indexical finger.3 Of course as a proverb it is even more importantly a cultural nugget—a ‘‘gem’’ to Erasmus—in the cultural code of a society that valued and collected the treasures of prudence and traditional wisdom.4 When Irenius initially invokes the saying, he is arguing that English common law is ‘‘inconvenient’’—that is, unfitting—for Ireland, inasmuch as it was not framed for Irish circumstances.5 Rejecting a conception of human law in strict accord with abstract justice, he maintains pragmatically that laws are only just if they can prevent current evils and provide for ‘‘the safetye of the Comon weale.’’ He then offers an example of how this safety ought to be balanced against an abstract right, explaining, ‘‘It is a flatt wronge to punishe the thoughte or purpose of anye before it be acted, ffor trewe Iustice 168 ‘‘The saiying self’’ in Spenser’s View of the Present State of Ireland 169 punisheth nothinge but the evill acte or wicked worde, yeat by the lawes of all kingedomes it is a capitall Cryme to devize or purpose the deathe of the kinge’’ because regicide would more harm the commonweal than subsequent ‘‘punishment of the Malefactours coulde remedye.’’ It is to encapsulate this explanation of an exception to the general principle that he concludes, ‘‘better is a mischief then an inconvenience’’ (65–66). Before dealing fully with the interpretive possibilities that Irenius’ concluding proverb embodies, I will need to describe its reiteration by Eudoxus , yet a couple of preliminary observations are possible here. First, the proverb’s context suggests that a mischief is a wrong or harm done—in words cited by the OED in the relevant entry—‘‘to one or some particular persons’’ as distinct from a greater harm ‘‘to the whole Common-wealth in generall.’’6 Second, if we take the word ‘‘capital’’ in Irenius’ phrase ‘‘capitall cryme’’ at face value to indicate an offense deserving the death penalty, then his principle of preventive homicide agrees with the published views of Jean Bodin but goes beyond the penalty for such a crime of intention specified in the Statutes of Ireland during the reign of Elizabeth.7 In Ireland the statutory penalty for devising the death of the king was forfeiture of all the offender’s possessions and ‘‘perpetuall imprisonment,’’ although a repeat offense, which could even include imagining regicide, brought death.8 At the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, the Statutes of England imposed the same penalty, but this was later toughened: in the thirteenth year of her reign, the English Parliament made the penalty capital on the first express offense and then, under the ever-increasing apprehension of a Romish threat in the twenty-seventh year (1584–85), on the first imagined offense.9 In passing it might be noted again, however, that the larger context of Irenius’ explanation is the unsuitability of English law for Irish circumstances.10 The heightened emphasis...

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