Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge: Reflections on Objectivist Epistemology

Taking the Measure of a Definition: Response to Bogen

173 Taking the Measure of a Definition Response to Bogen Allan Gotthelf J im Bogen has provided us with a very thoughtful summary and critique of Rand’s theory of definition, attending to its basis in her theory of concepts. Though I do not think he always gets Rand’s views right, my disagreement is not primarily with his exposition but with his critique, and I will, in the body of this response, address such interpretative matters only when they bear directly on this.1 Bogen’s main complaint, stated in his opening sentence, is that Rand incorrectly assumes that “all definitions are of the same kind, do the same kinds of cognitive work, and should be evaluated against the same standards .” On Rand’s account of definition, as he puts it in his title, “One size [i.e., type of definition] fits all [cognitive situations].” In fact, he argues, definitions perform many different functions in cognition and thus come in various types (“sizes”), and definitions of any sort are not as important for some cognitive tasks as Rand thinks. I am going to argue that some of the things Bogen calls “definitions” are not actually definitions. For those that are, and perform cognitive 1. Two aspects of Rand’s theory of concepts that I do not think Bogen gets quite right, which I will not discuss in the body of this response, are (i) his account of her file-folder 174 ■ Allan Gotthelf roles other than those emphasized by Rand, I will argue that they can do so only because they also perform the role that Rand identifies as fundamental to a definition. Let us review Rand’s account of that role. A concept, for her, is a retained unitary grasp of indefinitely many relevantly similar particulars. Its definition sharpens that grasp and facilitates its retention and use. As Rand puts it, the definition “is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed by [that] concept. . . . [Its] purpose . . . is to distinguish [that] concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its units differentiated [in one’s mind] from all other existents.” It does this by “specif[ying] the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated” (ITOE 40–41). This is a definition’s primary cognitive function. If only a few distinguishing characteristics of the existents subsumed by the concept are known, the definition would state those characteristics. As the number of known distinguishing characteristics multiplies beyond what could be held in conscious awareness all at once, what is needed is a way of condensing that knowledge into a graspable unit—a specification of a single (or small number of) distinguishing characteristic(s) that brings the others (and the knowledge associated with them) readily to mind. The characteristic(s) that does this is the one that is fundamental to the grouping in question, the one known to be responsible for, and thus explanatory of, the others. This is the characteristic Rand calls essential: the fundamental distinguishing characteristic. More precisely (as I wrote analogy and (ii) his reference to her theory as holding that concepts aim to capture “natural groups.” (i) Bogen treats Rand’s file-folder analogy as though it is the referents of the concepts that are being filed; Rand instead speaks of the concept as “a file folder in which man’s mind files his knowledge of the existents it subsumes” (ITOE 66–67). On this point, see the quotation from Salmieri and Gotthelf 2005 in note 10 of my essay in part 1 and the discussions of the file-folder analogy in the essays in the same part of this volume by Salmieri and James Lennox. (ii) Bogen’s references to “natural groups” correctly suggest that Rand thinks conceptual groupings are not subjective, but he appears to attribute to her a realism regarding concepts which she rejects in favor of the view that concepts are objective in the sense I discuss in the last section of my essay. Because of this, the standard of “comprehensiveness” that Bogen attributes to her would need to be reworded, in accordance with the norms of concept-formation I discuss in that same section. For further discussion of Rand’s position on “natural groups” in (what I take to be) Bogen’s sense, see Onkar Ghate’s “Natural Kinds and Rand’s Theory of Concepts: Reflections on Griffiths” in part 2 of this volume. [3.149.250.1] Project...