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RUNNING HEAD RECTO Conclusion Changes in the Moscow Trade Organizations ■ The nomination of Andropov to be leader of the Communist Party in 1982 was a clear sign that the KGB had regained a level of power in the Soviet political system that it had not had since the 1930s. The security force’s influence had increased during the 1970s, primarily through its battle against lawbreakers —speculators and smugglers, among others—a battle in which, by Soviet standards, the KGB was successful. These operations enlarged the KGB’s responsibilities , particularly when it was mandated to remove corrupt senior leaders and expose the “caviar mafia” in the southern Caucasus. The KGB enhanced its image in society during that decade by presenting itself as a force dedicated to ensuring the implementation of Soviet law. It focused on the principle that everyone is equal before the law and that all citizens are accountable for their actions. By 1982, the KGB was in charge of applying this norm and punishing transgressors , whatever their position in society might be. The principle was important to the KGB, which presented itself as the only organization in the country that could successfully fight corruption. This study focuses on Moscow because the dominant faction of the nomenklatura and the greatest concentration of resources in the Soviet Union were found in the capital. The central state apparatus in Moscow determined the allocation of resources for the whole country. The capital was also a place where the demand for goods was harder to meet, because it was where the political elite, with their more cosmopolitan tastes, lived and had to compete with other elites for the same scarce goods. For these reasons, corruption existed on a large scale in Moscow, but although regions such as Krasnodar and Rostov also experienced high rates of corruption, data for those areas were not as complete or as accessible as the data for Moscow, and the original sources could not be consulted. Nonetheless, this study shows that the major difference between Moscow and the regions was that in the capital, the leaders of the central power and the security services in particular were generally less tolerant toward corruption than their counterparts in other regions. The launching of an anticorruption campaign—enforcing the rule of equality before the law, which was being flouted—was an enterprise that would clearly 0 0 pay political dividends, widening the KGB’s influence in the political system. The challenge was huge: punishing the authors of infractions at the upper echelons meant attacking the elite. It was not certain that the KGB could win against the group that controlled the resources and could therefore put up the strongest resistance. The phenomenon of corruption can be explained in different ways. It was perceived by many Communist Party officials as the major cause of food shortages in the internal trade network, and therefore, the Party was hoping that the KGB could significantly improve the situation. The KGB provided the Party with information that gave credibility to its assumption that corruption was the main cause of the problem. Moreover, by allowing the KGB a free hand to tackle corruption , the Party could disclaim responsibility if the operation failed. If, as both these organizations believed, corruption was a major cause of the problems in the distribution of resources in the Soviet Union, especially in the area of food, it was also a consequence of those same problems. The latter view is widespread among scholars, but, of course, it was unacceptable to the Kremlin. It was necessary to find another explanation that did not discredit the Soviet system and would hide the real causes of the shortcomings in the trade sector. Did KGB leaders fabricate the urgency for an anticorruption campaign with the aim of enhancing their political influence? Whatever we may think of this suggestion, it remains true that in 1980, corruption preoccupied many people in Soviet society. Some members of the nomenklatura deplored the fact that corruption was so widespread that it posed a threat to the power of the state. Consumers were frustrated by the shortages in stores. Even some dissidents pointed to corruption as society’s primary problem. These groups were not opposed to the anticorruption campaign, at least not in its initial stage, although the fact that the campaign was spearheaded by the KGB did not make for unanimity. The majority of Soviet citizens supported the principle of punishing lawbreakers, irrespective of their rank. The KGB’s operations should be appraised objectively...

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