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RUNNING HEAD VERSO 3 Who, How Many, and How Much? Corruption in the Moscow Trade Organizations ■ From analyzing the impact of the KGB’s crackdown on the trade organizations , we now turn to an analysis of those who were suspected, accused, and convicted of corruption and to the scope of bribe-giving as a form of corruption in the Moscow trade network, scope being a reference to the number of people and the amount of money involved. Among the published analyses of the different facets of this corruption, none has yet given concrete details on the employees in the trade organizations who gave or accepted bribes. The focus here is primarily on the food sector because that is where most of the available data were. During the first months of 1983, the KGB was at the zenith of its power, and the political outlook in the country could not have been better for it. The KGB effectively controlled politics, the economy, and law enforcement and enjoyed broad popular support. The media had helped the KGB by printing many articles on how corruption was a serious threat to society. Even intellectuals looked to the KGB to establish a greater measure of law and order, joining in the consensus that such a move would solve problems and lead to improvements in several areas of society. Andropov’s actions met with approval when, in the first months of 1983, the KGB, taking advantage of its favorable position, unleashed its campaign, which hit hard and high. Tactics were carefully practiced, and the best officers were mobilized. The investigators knew that simply arresting the trade leaders would not put an end to the corruption. It was true that the KGB would make a splash by targeting giants like five-star hotels Kosmos and Russia , considered foreign oases, and factories reputed to be in the hands of gangs 00 0 that produced difficult-to-obtain products, such as alcohol. However, its central objective was to attack and destroy the whole network of graft in the trade organizations . They systematically investigated one store after another, one warehouse after another, beginning with the most important and interrogating and incarcerating thousands of people. Officials and Organizations Involved in Bribery Records of the KGB’s investigation of Glavtorg (the Moscow Trade Administration ) provide a considerable quantity of data on corruption in the Soviet trade organizations in Moscow. Such a large-scale investigation had never been undertaken , and it required a long period of evidence collection, from November 1982 until the end of 1985. There were twenty thousand people employed at Glavtorg, which had direct jurisdiction over five thousand stores.1 Within Glavtorg, the RPTs (District Food Trade Organizations) managed two thousand food stores.2 The KGB inquiry began with the Glavtorg administration, twenty-nine of the thirty-one RPTs, and fifty of the more important gastronoms.3 Glavtorg directed the distribution and sale of consumer products in the capital . Its president, Tregubov, was surrounded by a bevy of vice presidents: Deputy President Petrikov; Second Vice President Khokhlov, who headed the personnel department; Third Vice President Kireev, head of the inspection and control department ; and Fourth Vice President Kliachin, in charge of accounting. It did not take long before the heads of Glavtorg, with the exception of Tregubov, admitted their guilt. Each of them had amassed large amounts of money from bribes: Petrikov with 84,400 rubles, Khokhlov with 33,209, and Kireev with 17,500. It was from the directors of three of the four top Moscow gastronoms that the KGB obtained the most impressive results, with 300,000 rubles in Sokolov’s possession , 50,000 for Tveritinov, and 171,300 for Filippov among those who had profited enormously from corruption. Sokolov had received even higher amounts than the heads of Glavtorg. The police data show that cases of bribery were uncovered in twenty-nine RPTs and that five thousand employees had committed reprehensible acts.4 The directors of the Pervomaiski, Volgogradski, and Kuibishev RPTs and the Sokol’niki universam were jailed mainly because of the privileged relationship they had with Glavtorg president Tregubov. Baigelman, the director of the Kuibishev RPT, admitted to being one of those who had received a very large amount of money, a confession that enabled him to leave prison camp earlier than expected. The investigators gave details on the kind of life that Kantora (a relative of the mayor of Moscow) had been living. Searches carried out at Kantora’s fifteen-bedroom secondary residence revealed...

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