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Introduction
- University of Pittsburgh Press
- Chapter
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RUNNING HEAD RECTO Introduction ■ By investigating the corruption permeating the internal trade organizations of the Soviet Union—and, more precisely, the Moscow trade network—we can learn a great deal about the Soviet system under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev from the 1960s until 1982. The rise of the trade organizations’ power and political influence reflected in many ways the overall evolution of the Soviet system during the Brezhnev era, and the public exposure of this web of elite privilege and influence would only add to the already developing momentum for change in the Soviet Union. Ironically, it was the sworn protector of the security of the Soviet state, the KGB, that, in the course of its battle to unveil the endemic bribery, unfair practices, and influential favoritism in these trade organs, ultimately undermined its fundamental structure. This work focuses on the two most important Moscow trade organizations: Glavtorg (Moscow Trade Administration) and Glavka or Glavmosplodovoshprom (Administration of the Moscow Fruit and Vegetable Offices). Despite having constituted an influential social force during the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet trade organizations have been the subject of very few studies in the West. This work addresses that gap. The study of political economy involves analyzing social groups, the nature of relations among them, and the distribution of resources among them. To examine how social groups in Soviet Russia were favored in the allocation of resources , it is first necessary to draw a distinction between what socialist ideology proclaimed and Soviet law allowed versus the reality of how resources were allocated . I have thus focused on how goods were actually allocated and have made the assumption that corruption largely dictated the allocation process in a system that ultimately favored certain groups over others. This view relates to concepts of economic and political power, in particular, the relationship between economic and political resources. It is logical to conclude that the groups economically profiting from the distribution of goods also had certain political advantages. The official task of the Moscow trade organization executives was to distribute consumer goods according to government directives, but those executives used a considerable quantity of the merchandise for personal gain. They ix acquired power and influence by selling scarce goods at high prices. Although their activities were illegal, they were also tolerated, thus allowing these trade organizations to obtain not only wealth but also power thanks to an entrenched system of corruption. The exchange of resources for support and protection from officials in the higher echelons of the government and Communist Party became systematic. The Moscow trade organizations became so powerful in the 1970s that they were able to evade Kremlin control. However, it should be noted that not all of the trade executives benefited equally from corruption. Some trade officials benefited more and others less, while some even found the arrangement to be to their detriment. Obviously, certain groups of executives were in a better position to take advantage of resources under their control, depending on the products and the time period. Another factor that came into play was the personal attributes of the individual executives involved. This book is also a study of the KGB in its attempt to fight corruption in the Moscow trade network. Having access to primary sources held by law enforcement agencies provided me with the opportunity to study the KGB from the inside and to uncover new information about its methods and personnel during the leadership of Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev. The widespread influence of the Moscow trade network was well established by the 1980s, but the KGB was the only organization that the Moscow trade leaders were not able to buy off. In part, this gap in the systematic corruption occurred because the KGB had also expanded its influence during the 1970s. Soon, these two rising and powerful institutions collided. The trade network acquired its political strength largely through corruption. Trade executives used calculated defenses in their battle with the KGB, employing the capital they had accumulated to buy not only protection and supplies but also to pay large bribes to have laws passed or altered in accordance with their interests. They also distributed funds to friends and relatives who held important positions and could lobby in their favor. Utilizing these economic and political resources, the trade organizations managed to seriously undermine the KGB and the Soviet system during the years of perestroika. As a result, the trade organizations —a conservative force in the Brezhnev era—became a force for change in 1985...