Philosophical Inquiries: An Introduction to Problems of Philosophy

The Demands of Morality

110 the functional/Purposive nature of Morality The pervasive relativism of the age views moral principles and standards as little more than a matter of custom based on practical convenience , like the rules of the road for driving—useful devices to diminish conflict in contexts of human interaction, but lacking any deeper validation and legitimacy, and certainly without any claims to universality. Morality as regarded from this angle is predicated on local custom, as part of the mores of the group. And any such behavioral code is as good as any other: it is simply a matter of “When in Rome do as the Romans do.” All moralities are created equal. There is no place for moral objectivity. And so, nowadays a widespread but nevertheless unfortunate tendency to deny the possibility of rational controversy about moral matters prevails, relegating morality to the never-never land of matters of taste, feeling, or otherwise discursively insupportable opinion. Such a view is profoundly inappropriate. But once one recognizes the functional aspect of morality—as inculcating actions that safe9 the Demands of Morality rescher phil inq text.indd 110 3/1/10 3:15 PM the DeManDs of MoralItY 111 guard the real interest of people—then moral issues become open to rational deliberation.1 This functional aspect of morality, its very nature representing an inherently appropriate, end-oriented project, blocks the prospect of indifferentism or of a relativistically detached view of morality as a mere matter of individual inclination or of “the customs of the tribe.” But such a radically subjective view along the lines that “With moral issues there is only what people think; there just are no objective facts of the matter” is ultimately untenable for anyone who, rejecting nihilism, gives credence to some sort of morality or other. For one cannot consistently look on one’s own moral convictions as “merely matters of opinion.” In doing this one would thereby ipso facto fail to accept them as such—that is, as moral convictions. In view of what can possibly qualify as such, it lies in the very nature of our moral judgments that we regard them as justified via a rationale regarding what is required by due heed of the interests of people. Morality, after all, is an end-governed purposive enterprise—one that is structured by its having a characteristic functional mission of transparent appropriateness. For it is morality’s object to equip people with a body of norms (rules and values) that make for peaceful and collectively satisfying coexistence by facilitating their living together and interacting in a way that is productive for the realization of the “general benefit”—of the wider community as a whole. The pursuit of righteousness that constitutes morality is like the pursuit of health that constitutes medicine—both are projects with an inherent teleology of their own, geared to fostering patterns of action and interaction that promote the best interests of people in general. The functional nature of morality means that being thought to be morally appropriate no more makes a certain action to be so than being thought to be medically effective or transportationally efficient would render a certain practice to be so. The claim that a rule or practice is morally appropriate—that in the conditions prevailing in a society it is effective in serving and enhancing the real interests of people in general—is thoroughly objective and “factual.” One is thus rationally constrained by considerations of mere self-consistency to see one’s own moral position as rationally superior to the available alternatives . If one did not take this stance—did not deem one’s moral rescher phil inq text.indd 111 3/1/10 3:15 PM 112 the DeManDs of MoralItY position to be effectively optimal—then one could not see oneself as rationally justified in adopting it, so that it would, in consequence, fail to be one’s own real moral position, contrary to hypothesis.2 Because the claims of morality are categorical, to see morality as subjective is in fact to abandon it. The validity of most moral appraisals is accordingly something that is objectively determinable and nowise lies in the eye of the beholder. For someone to say, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money” is not simply for them to assert that you stole the money and additionally to evince disapprobation and urge a different sort of future conduct, but rather—and...