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180 10 Planning for Catastrophe How France Is Preparing for the Avian Flu and What It Means for Resilience Claude Gilbert We are witnessing the emergence of new threats with fairly specific characteristics . The scale on which they unfold is wide and increasingly global. Their effects can be ascribed to specific agents or events as much as to vulnerabilities peculiar to today’s societies. Health threats top the list of these future threats. Epidemics and pandemics are once again provoking concern , especially the possibility of an avian flu–related pandemic on a global scale. This is not simply a matter of a revival of old threat agents; it is the emergence of a new type of threat whose characteristics demand new forms of crisis management. Most countries have taken and still take this threat very seriously, despite its highly hypothetical nature. This is especially the case in France. The alerts of the World Health Organization (WHO) prompted the French government to devise a response plan that has since been updated annually (Plan “Pandémie Grippale” 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Concrete actions were swiftly initiated in addition to the creation of a regularly updated plan, including the appointment of an interministerial delegate specifically in charge of combating a flu pandemic (August 2005). Working groups were set up in various ministries; an interministerial dialogue was initiated, first limited to the ministries that seemed to be most immediately concerned (agriculture, health, interior) and then slowly expanded. Substantial funds were earmarked to support these actions. In parallel, programs were Planning for Catastrophe 181 launched in the public research sector to promote the development of specific studies in this field (essentially in the life sciences). Yet despite this seemingly full-scale mobilization, an important question needs to be considered, concerning France and probably other countries as well: to what extent have the authorities and experts who confront the threat of a pandemic really taken note of the characteristics of this type of situation? In this chapter, I address this question and argue that the idea of resilience (i.e., the capacity for collective action in the face of unexpected extreme events that shatter infrastructure and disrupt normal operating conditions) needs to be given more attention. A Threat That Poses Unusual Problems The link between crisis and uncertainty (as a defining characteristic) is well established (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977; Rosenthal, Charles, and t’Hart 1989). In the case of a pandemic, there likely will be an especially high level of diverse uncertainties. Likewise, the possibility of a really long period of crisis on a global scale raises questions with regard to the conditions required to sustain collective life. The pressing question is how collective life, in its most ordinary dimensions, can be sustained in the long term in the face of seriously deteriorated conditions. Facing Deep Uncertainties The work of scientific experts in virology and epidemiology, both in France and abroad, indicates that a flu epidemic should be considered inevitable. This conclusion is based on statistics and the history of diseases. The mutation or hybridization of the H5N1 virus seems to be a possible if not probable future cause of such a pandemic. The risk of a pandemic also seems to be closely linked to globalization and the internationalization of human activities. The massive growth of all kinds of trade is considered to be the main factor in rapid, large-scale dissemination of the disease. The risk is therefore associated as much with the actual nature of a future virus as with the prevailing system of international trade and the circulation of humans , animals, and goods, along with the resulting vulnerabilities. These are elements of relative “certainty” that mask many uncertainties. No one can foresee the severity and precise characteristics of the disease : different modes of propagation (other than by air), incubation time, symptoms and specific ailments, and possibilities of immunization may all differ. Any hypotheses are fragile at best, which seems to limit efforts at anticipation prior to the occurrence of hybridization or mutation of the virus. [3.138.105.124] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 09:57 GMT) 182 Claude Gilbert Moreover, an H5N1-related pandemic is in itself still hypothetical in so far as a flu pandemic could stem from another virus strain. Likewise, there is no certainty that the pandemic would develop from an epizooty (i.e., a disease that simultaneously affects a large number of animals of the same or different species). The pandemic could last several weeks, several months, or...

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