Aporetics: Rational Deliberation in the Face of Inconsistency

5. The Aporetics of Counterfactual History

74  Two Types of Historical Counterfactuals The primary aim of historical inquiry is to elucidate the past—to describe and to explain the course of past events. Now in describing we are, of course, engaged in a strictly factual discussion. Here there is—or should be—little room for fanciful speculation: Leopold von Ranke's insistence that the historian's concern is with “how it actually was" (wie es eigentlich gewesen war) stands paramount. However, in moving beyond description to explain a course of historical events, it transpires that counterfactuals are an almost indispensably useful resource, and here aporetics once again comes to the fore. Thus we know perfectly well that (for example) “if Hitlerite Germany had developed an atomic bomb by 1943, World War II would have taken a very different course.” What we have here is a counterfactual conditional : an answer to a question that asks what would transpire if,   5 The Aporetics of Counterfactual History The Aporetics of Counterfactual History 75 where this antecedent is false—or thought to be so. Such conditionals pivot on unrealized possibilities—such as Napoleon's remaining on Elba or Nazi Germany's developing an atomic bomb. Along these line, the distinction between falsifying and truthifying causal counterfactuals is particularly significant in the context of historical issues: Falsifying case: If something-or-other—which actually did happen—had not happened, then certain specifiable consequences would have ensued. (Example: If the ministers of George III had not taxed the colonies, the American Revolution would have been averted in 1776.) Truthifying case: If something-or-other—which did not actually happen—had happened, then certain specifiable consequences would have ensued. (Example: If the American colonies had remained subject to Britain, control of the British Empire eventually would have shifted from London to North America.)1 With that first, falsifying example we have a situation of the following sort: sALient beLiefs: p: George III’s ministers taxed the American colonies. q: The American colonies revolted in 1776. Without p we would have not-q: not-p ⇒ not-q: The American Revolution of 1776 was in substantial measure a response to George III’s ministers taxing the colonies. hypothesis: not-p Overall, we now confront the following situation: Assume not-p in the face of the aforementioned beliefs: p, q, not-p ⇒ not-q. The problem then is that even after dropping 76 The Aporetics of Counterfactual History p, we must come to terms with the inconsistency of the group: not-p, q, not-p ⇒ not-q. Andso hereoursuppositionofnot-p constrainsachoicebetween the specifically factual q and the relational not-p ⇒ not-q. By contrast, in the second, truthifying example we have a situation of the following sort: sALient beLiefs: not-p (The American colonies did not remain subject to Britain.) q (Control of the British Empire has remained in London rather than North America.) Since q then not-p: q ⇒ not-p. (The retention of North America eventually would have disestablished the primacy of London.) hypothesis: p And so here we have the situation: Assume p in the face of those specified beliefs: not-p, q, q ⇒ not-p. The problem then is that even after dropping not-p, we must come to terms with the inconsistency of the group: p, q, q ⇒ not-p. In short, our supposition constrains a choice between the specifically factual q and the relational q ⇒ not-p. Thus in both cases alike we must choose between a categorical and a relationally conditional fact. And as long as we prioritize comparatively more general relationships (conditional relationships included) over more restrictedly particular claims on grounds of informativeness , we must in both cases abandon the former and accept the latter in its place. In their logical structure the two cases are thus very similar, although they differ quite significantly in other respects. Historical counterfactuals of the falsifying type—“if such and The Aporetics of Counterfactual History 77 such had not happened”—generally address the preconditions for an actual occurrence—its temporally antecedent requisites. They are in general retrospectively cause determinative in nature. And this sort of thing is—or ought to be—grist for history’s mill, given the explanatory mission of the enterprise. (It should be noted that counterfactuals of regret along the lines of “If only I had not done X but had done Y instead, I would not be in the mess I’m in today” are in...