Ambition and Division: Legacies of the George W. Bush Presidency

15. Conclusion: Bush's Legacy and the Limits of Ambition

285 t he preceding chapters have revealed the George W. Bush presidency as unusual in the wide scope of its ambitions. The Bush administration’s redefinition of foreign policy, spurred by 9/11, led to an audacious doctrine of preempting likely terrorist threats overseas and prosecution of an initially successful war with Iraq in 2003. Domestically, the White House voiced the agenda of its partisan base in pressing for successive tax cuts, even in the face of growing budget deficits, and conservative stands on judicial appointments and social issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion. In an attempt to expand his supportive coalition, Bush tacked toward the center in his approach to education, prescription drugs for seniors, and immigration. Just as Bush’s innovations in foreign policy altered basic parameters of international relations, his approach to taxing and spending reshaped the politics of fiscal policy. These far-reaching changes are broadly consistent with the major project of the administration : the entrenchment of a Reagan-style conservative regime of military hawkishness and supply-side economics within the major institutions of national politics. Did this big project succeed? The administration initially proved more concLUsion bush’s Legacy and the Limits of ฀mbition Steven E. Schier 15 286 steven e. schier successful in achieving its policy and electoral goals than most observers predicted at the time of Bush’s inauguration. Still, many impediments stood in Bush’s way. Several of the features of contemporary politics I mentioned in this volume’s introduction served to frustrate Bush’s plans. Many characteristics of “institutional thickening,” in Stephen Skowronek ’s phrase, curbed Bush’s ambitions. In this situation, according to Skowronek, “more has to be changed to break from the past, and those adversely affected by the changes will be able to put up more formidable resistance” (Skowronek 1997, 56). Three aspects of institutional thickening were very prominent when Bush took office. First, party power was weaker than during the times of successful regime reconstruction (Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt) or orthodox innovation (Polk and Theodore Roosevelt). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is much more difficult to install a durable political regime through long-term changes in mass party identification. The lasting success of any party’s “governing team” is less electorally certain now. A major impediment to such aspirations is the large number of political independents whose allegiance seems beyond secure control of either party. These independents split evenly between Bush and his opponents in 2000 and 2004 but shifted strongly against Bush’s party in the 2006 midterm elections (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2007, 280). Independents also voted Democratic in the 2008 presidential and congressional elections (Cable News Network 2008a; 2008b). Second, there was an even partisan balance in the House and Senate, which impedes ambitious legislative programs unless a president can command virtually unanimous support from congressional partisans. Bush was able to do this with his tax cuts and judicial nominees but failed notably at this on immigration and Social Security reform. Third, the proliferation of thousands of interest groups in Washington (Rauch 1999) complicates presidential initiatives in domestic policy to no end. Interest group battles over proposed oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the administration’s faith-based initiative proposals in 2003, for example, stymied progress on these fronts for the Bush administration. Similar interest group conflicts scuttled immigration reform during Bush’s second term. Given these impediments, the scale of Bush’s early political and policy successes is impressive. He benefited, as John J. Coleman and Kevin S. Price note in their chapter, from several GOP electoral victories beginning in 1994, which created opportunity for realignment into majority party status in the early twenty-first century. The GOP’s ascendancy in 287 conclusion the Senate in 2002 gave the party control of Congress (albeit narrowly), and, as Bertram Johnson notes in his chapter, Bush made much of this opportunity . Bush’s sway over Congress from 2001 through 2006 was, arguably , broader than Bill Clinton ever enjoyed. Though Clinton in 1993–1994 had a Democratic-controlled Congress, his relations with Democratic lawmakers were continually rocky during his presidency. Several authors here attest to the strategic and tactical dexterity of the Bush administration in extending its political control in Washington during the early years of Bush’s presidency. The George W. Bush presidency frequently was tactically preemptive. John J. Coleman has defined preemptive tactics...