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77 Data on child recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa collected by Achvarina and Reich (2006) and Becker’s comparison of Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Burma in this volume demonstrate that the proportion of child soldiers varies considerably from one group to another. A wide variety of case studies from around the world also suggests that the welfare of the children employed by violent groups varies across organizations. In this chapter we focus on this variance and examine the patterns of recruitment across different kinds of violent organizations. We also seek to answer the general puzzle of why a group would recruit children to be soldiers. ThedemandandSupplyofchildSoldiers Discussing the demand and supply of child soldier labor may seem callous, but it provides a useful way to think systematically about why an armed group would recruit young adolescents. As detailed in a number of the other chapters in this volume, a variety of factors are associated with the phenomenon of child soldiers. We can categorize these factors as they relate to the supply or demand for children in armed groups. One structural phenomenon that has altered the demand for child soldiers is the wide availability of new technologies to exploit this especially odious ChAPter 5 RECRUITING CHILDREN FOR ARMED CONFLICT JenschristopherAndvigandScottGates 78 JenS chriSToPher AndviG And ScoTT GATeS form of child labor. Cheap, easily available weapons, such as the AK-47, as outlined in the chapter by Peter Singer, diminish the inherent advantages of an adult soldier compared to a child soldier. In this way, new, lighter (but more powerful) weapons increase the ability of an armed group to substitute adult labor with child labor. Material and nonmaterial incentives play an important role in recruitment and retention in any organization. The chapters by Gutiérrez Sanín, Wessells, Singer, and to some extent Pugel, focus on the way groups recruit and maintain their armies. As these authors point out, some groups determine that children may be easier (through coercion, intimidation, or persuasion) to recruit than adults, given the strategic ambitions of the group. Certainly, groups lacking a clear ideological basis may find it easier to maintain the loyalty, and participation ,ofchildren.Desertionisapotentialproblemfacinganyarmy,andchildren often find it harder to desert than adults. To discourage desertion further, some groups force children to commit atrocities in their home village, thus severing former bonds and limiting the child’s options. Clearly, demand-based factors play a major role in the variation across countries. Similar contextual factors affect the supply of children available for recruitment or abduction. Achvarina and Reich demonstrate in their chapter that such supply-based factors—for example , the level of poverty and the number of orphans in a population—poorly explain the variance in the incidence of child soldiering across sub-Saharan Africa. The protection and securitization of civilian populations (especially children) prove to be more significant factors. Indeed, as the chapter by Lischer shows, refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps are prime recruiting grounds for armed groups. Children are particularly vulnerable to the siren call of life outside the camp “fighting the good fight,” as well as to forced abduction. Factors such as poverty, education, war, refugee camp securitization, religious or ethnic identity, family or its absence, and friends all play a role in determining the supply of children available for recruitment (Cohn and Goodwin -Gill 1994; Brett and Specht 2004; Achvarina and Reich 2006a; Singer 2006). The dynamic interaction of a rebel group and the government may also affect supply, particularly when government actions provoke grievances and a desire for retribution. Such supply factors are indeed important, but they neglect demand. To understand the demand for child soldiers, we must look more closely into civil wars and violent organizations, as well as understand what motivates the children themselves. Many of the factors that shape supply are rather invariant across many of the conflicts; demand is what determines the actual number of children who are ordered to kill. [3.21.104.109] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 13:07 GMT) recruiTinG children for Armed conflicT 79 childSoldieringandchildcapabilities Analysis of child labor in the context of households and farms indicates that (young) children and adults are likely to be employed as complementary goods, while adults’ unskilled labor are substitutes. (Informally, a complementary good is one that should be consumed with another good; for example, a printer and an ink cartridge. A substitute good can stand in the place of another good, such as butter and margarine.) The differentiation of task between younger...

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