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189 In The Trouble with Principle Stanley Fish tells the story of a Klansman who rejected Klan ideology. The change occurred when the Klansman heard a leader of the group say that upon its assumption of power “defectives of a variety of kinds would be put into special colonies or otherwise dealt with. This . . . point was accompanied by a list of defectives, and among those named were persons with cleft palates. It so happened that the daughter of the once, and now instantly former, white supremacist was herself afflicted by that condition” (282). Fish points out that this moment could have taken another direction: “it would have been perfectly possible for the devoted father to have said to himself, ‘Well, I really love Mary, but the cause is the cause and I guess she’ll have to go’” (282). This story provides an interesting example wherein a believer was jolted out of belief by sudden awareness of a contradiction between an ideologic and a powerful emotion—his love for a daughter. We don’t learn from Fish’s version whether or not the former Klansman’s “conversion on the spot” altered any of his other beliefs. Did the conflict between Klan ideology and his daughter’s circumstance forge new articulations or disarticulations? Did the “instantly former” Klansman become aware, for example, that the Klan’s ugly policies of exclusion apply to other people who fulfill its definition of non-Aryan imperfection? To give up Klan belief is to end a set of practices—attending meetings, reading literature, associating with like-minded members of the group—but 7 how beliefs change 190 hOw beliefs chANge forgoing belief in Klan ideology does not require a former believer to give up his family, his job, his religious beliefs, his lifestyle, or even his racism. If Klan belief and belonging mattered less to this former white supremacist than did his love for his daughter, that was the case because his subscription to that ideology was not tightly bound up with other beliefs and values he holds. Indeed, in this case the man who abandoned the Klan gained a lucrative new identity as “the author of a best-selling expose” (282). Fish names a second source of conversion—submission to authority— in addition to the fortuitous collusion of circumstance. He writes: “each of us has . . . someone or some text—the Pope, the Bible, Elvis, Lionel Trilling, Nietzsche, Satchel Paige, the Turner Diaries—whose authority is assumed, to the extent that we will think at least twice before dismissing or not taking seriously his or her or its pronouncements” (Trouble 283). In this essay Fish names only these two openings for change, and if my reading is correct he presents would-be rhetors with a stultifying problem. The appearance of a persuasive moment—when circumstances or authority converge with a belief system in such a way as to offer convincing proof that a change in belief is appropriate or necessary—is difficult to anticipate. Fish is aware of this. With regard to authority, he notes that “any authority, no matter how longstanding its hold on your imagination, can be dislodged in an instant, although that instant cannot be willed, cannot be planned for, and need not ever occur” (Trouble 283). Fish cites William James to the effect that belief is prior to rationality and that it is to some extent inaccessible to consciousness (Trouble 284). I heartily agree with both of these points. I agree as well that there is no “independent reality” that can “present itself” to individuals in such a way that they change their minds about it or anything else (Fish, Trouble 283). But Fish’s model is of little use to rhetoricians insofar as it effectively denies rhetorical efficacy.1 In this view a rhetor who wants to change someone’s belief must be content to wait for adherents to find exceptions to its truth claims in their life circumstances or must muster sufficient and appropriate dissenting sources of authority. These difficulties are compounded by the nature of belief, which mitigates against either of these events occurring. Ideology and affect can color readings of circumstance so that the “reality” they construct always already confirms their correctness. Christ’s failure to reappear on earth has resulted in disappointment and disaffection for some apocalyptists, but others simply renew their efforts to determine the correct time of the return (Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter). And since dissenting rhetors are configured in apocalyptist discourse not as authorities...

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