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1 Focusing on Scientific Understanding H e n k W. d e R e g t, S a b i n a L e o n e L L i , a n d k a i e i g n e R L฀ In the eyes of most scientists, and of educated laypeople, understanding is a central goal of science. In the past centuries scientific research has enormously increased our understanding of the world. Indeed, it seems a commonplace to state that the desire for understanding is a chief motivation for doing science. But despite the prima facie plausibility of these claims, it is not so clear what their precise content is. What do we mean when we say that scientists understand, for example, global climate change? What is involved in achieving scientific understanding of phenomena, be they the origin of the universe, the structure of matter, the behavior of organisms, or economic and social developments? These are fundamental philosophical questions, yet they have received little philosophical attention. This volume constitutes the first concerted effort by philosophers of science to explore these questions and provide a variety of possible answers. Lord Kelvin famously declared, “It seems to me that the test of ‘Do we or not understand a particular subject in physics?’ is, ‘Can we make a mechanical model of it?’” (Kargon and Achinstein 1987, 3). What is expressed here is not only the idea that understanding is an aim of science (in this case, physics) but also the view that there is a preferred way of achieving that aim, namely, devising mechanical models of physical phenomena. Yet, while Kelvin’s approach had strong appeal and was widely supported in the mid-nineteenth century, it has proved to be untenable in the light of later developments in physics. In particular, the advent of quantum theory refuted the universal applicability of chapter title verso 1 de Regt Txt•.indd 1 9/8/09 11:26:52 AM 2 mechanical modeling as a road to understanding. The failure of such models led to a discussion among physicists about what kind of understanding physics could and should achieve. Thus, Erwin Schrödinger criticized the abstract mathematical theory of matrix mechanics for its lack of Anschaulichkeit (intelligibility , visualizability). Schrödinger (1928, 27) argued that “we cannot really alter our manner of thinking in space and time, and what we cannot comprehend within it we cannot understand at all.” Werner Heisenberg (1927, 172), by contrast, believed that nonvisualizable theories also could provide understanding (anschauliches Verstehen) of quantum phenomena. These examples show that ideas about what it takes to understand phenomena can change. Moreover, they reveal that it is important to distinguish between understanding phenomena and understanding the theories or models used to represent and/or explain phenomena. While scientists’ ultimate goal is to understand phenomena, achieving that goal often involves the development and understanding of appropriate theories or models. A look at sciences other than physics confirms that there are many ways to achieve understanding of phenomena and, consequently, that there are many forms of understanding that play a role in scientific practice. Within experimental biology, for instance, there is a strong emphasis on understanding phenomena through the manipulation of biological entities such as organisms or their components. Biologists have developed several forms of experimental intervention ranging from the unobtrusive observation of animals in the field to the dissection of specimens in a laboratory. Psychologists, who cannot resort to the latter type of intervention on human subjects, rely on models and empathy to acquire understanding of the human mind. Similarly, but on a very different scale, economists favor the use of mathematical models and simulations to capture the behavior of the market under changing conditions. Given this diversity, it is not surprising that there is no satisfactory, generally accepted answer to the question of what precisely scientific understanding consists in, and how it is achieved. It seems to be impossible to give a single, universally valid definition of the notion of scientific understanding. But this impossibility should not drive philosophers away from the study of understanding . On the contrary, the multifaceted nature of understanding testifies to its central importance for practicing science and to the need for a philosophical analysis of its many aspects and forms. The essays in this book constitute a wide-ranging and in-depth investigation of the nature of scientific understanding . While a general account of understanding may prove to be unattainable, much can be said, as this book shows, about...

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