Spear of the Nation: Umkhonto weSizwe

6. The end of armed struggle

113 6 The end of armed struggle Underlying the desperate accounts of the battles, skirmishes and bombings, urban and rural, which we have described, is a great irony: that while mK cadres were being exhorted to ‘escalate the armed struggle’ in preparation for a revolutionary seizure of power, their political leaders were entering into covert negotiations with the enemy. This was later to be justified publicly as a ‘two-track’ strategy: maintaining the pressure of armed struggle while exploring the preconditions for negotiations. But there is a strong argument that the wisdom of Oliver Tambo and Nelson mandela lay in their understanding that a negotiated settlement was not only possible but the right thing to do. far from being a ‘miracle’, it was the outcome of a realistic assessment of the political context: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of South African 114 forces from Angola, the independence of Namibia, the pressure on the government from South African businessmen to keep the economy running, and the mounting cost in human life of the continually escalating armed struggle. As we have seen, the situation on the ground in South Africa had reached stalemate in the late 1980s. By 1988 the security forces had regained control over the urban townships, stabilising them through brute force, unrelenting State of emergency regulations and the removal of township leaders. They had also prevented ‘ungovernability’ from expanding into areas outside the African townships, and had protected their white support base, in the main, from being affected by the violent resistance. While the apartheid regime could maintain control through force,it could not gain legitimacy;and while the ANC had gained legitimacy, it could not win state power. It was in this context that a negotiated settlement became an attractive option to both sides. moreover, the changing international context made a negotiated settlement not only desirable but unavoidable. 1989 saw the revival of the mass Democratic movement (mDm) and a period of abertura 115 (opening) or liberalisation, in which the regime allowed some popular mobilisation as it prepared for negotiations. The release of the rivonia trialists and of State of emergency detainees, and a range of interesting local-level negotiations that involved recognising the leadership of the mass movement, all indicated that something momentous was imminent. P.W. Botha’s replacement by f.W. de Klerk as head of the National Party and then State President constituted the formal leadership change which allowed the ‘doves’ within the NP to pursue their strategy of a negotiated settlement. Notwithstanding the signs that change was on the cards, the unbanning of the ANC on 2 february 1990 and the subsequent release of Nelson mandela came as a shock to all but those in the inner circles of the ‘negotiation faction’ in both the ANC and the NP. A movement that had been illegal for three decades was now legal. The last of those imprisoned on robben Island were set free and the exiled leaders of the ANC were allowed to return home. These developments were a source of great joy to most South Africans. And yet there was widespread confusion about the way forward.What made things even more difficult was the escalation of violence in 116 KwaZulu-Natal and in the townships of Gauteng, where the struggle seemed far from over. It should be obvious that the decision to suspend the armed struggle in August 1990 was incomprehensible to many mK cadres. Having vested everything in the armed struggle, and believing that the people’s war strategy would be successful, they found it hard to accept that their leaders were insisting on a negotiated settlement. resource documents on the purpose and content of negotiations were distributed to ANC members to ensure that activists both in mK and in the mass movement understood what the shift in strategy entailed.even so – and especially in the areas of most violent conflict, such as the Natal midlands – the desire to rely on mK and keep fighting to the bitter end was strong. As Wonga Bottoman has written, ‘The last years of the eighties decade, even though we had earlier heard of talks, even understood the concept thereof, were confusing to us as soldiers, used to victory or Death slogans.’ The ANC suspended its armed struggle in terms of the Pretoria minute of August 1990. The suspension was an act of extraordinary restraint, and posed a great challenge for...