Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa

1. Peace as an Incentive for War

31 O N E Peace as an Incentive for War d Av i d k e e n t H i S C H A P t e r L o o K S At t H e i n C e n t i V e S F o r F u rt H e r V i o L e n C e that may be established by peace agreements. it does not aim for a comprehensive discussion but rather seeks to highlight a key element of building peace that has been somewhat neglected both at the policy level and in academic discussions. this is risk of “incentivizing” further violence through the very act of peacemaking. the question of how “inclusive” or “exclusive” a peace agreement should be is a difficult and critical one. A considerable measure of inclusion of the main armed groups—both at the negotiating table and in government—would appear to be necessary. Why else would they agree to lay down their arms? the case of liberia is instructive here. in the four years prior to the 1996 Abuja ii peace agreement, as Adekeye Adebajo has shown,1 the economic Community of West African States (eCoWAS), through its Cease-fire monitoring group (eComog), made a serious attempt to marginalize liberian warlords and support a civilian government in monrovia. yet peace agreements in this period simply did not stick, as powerful warlords refused to disarm and clung to their profitable economic activities. by 1996, subregional mediators exhibited a new determination to bring warlords into political power in monrovia. distasteful as this “warlords’ peace” was, it had the significant advantage that the agreement could actually be implemented; in this new climate, both demobilization and elections became possible.2 the constraints imposed by warring parties may be severe; but going too far in the direction of including and appeasing war leaders may 32 dAVid Keen damage equity, deepen impunity, and store up trouble for the future. there are grave dangers in excluding civil society and politicians not linked to armed groups. A key problem is the signal sent out: in particular , it may sometimes be difficult to discern the exact difference between rewarding people for giving up violence and rewarding people for taking it up. Armed groups have proliferated in many conflicts, and there may be many political interests who might potentially turn to arms if their grievances are not met. to what extent should a peace process embrace a proliferation of armed groups? is it possible that a peace process could itself encourage such proliferation? incentive-based approaches to peacemaking tend to focus on the violent (who constitute the immediate problem) while often ignoring those who have not (or not yet) been drawn into participation in violent processes. by contrast, those emphasizing a need for justice and an “end to impunity”—including human rights organizations—tend to focus on the importance of signals, notably to those who might one day contemplate violence. However, the advocates of both positions often “talk past” each other. incentivizing violence: three mechanisms there are three key incentive problems when it comes to peacemaking. the first key danger is that a peace process may exclude major armed groups taking part in a war, who will therefore have little incentive to abide by the peace. An extreme example was the 1997 khartoum Peace Agreement in Sudan, an agreement that actually excluded the main rebel organization, the Sudan People’s liberation Army (SPlA), and predictably did not bring the war to an end. Also in Sudan, the may 2006 darfur Peace Agreement was not accepted by two of the three rebel factions, and the khartoum government then set about attacking and intimidating the nonsignatories, in alliance with the one faction (under minni minawi) that had signed the agreement. the exclusion of the Arab militias—often referred to as Janjaweed—from the darfur peace process has also caused significant risks. A second problem is that even when the main armed groups are represented , the underlying causes of violence are likely to remain unaddressed . in particular, where large sections of civil society are excluded, this will tend to prolong or even exacerbate the grievances of ordinary citizens. What forms of corruption are being institutionalized in a 33 Peace as an incentive for War particular peace process? economic initiatives may help cement a peace agreement between armed factions, perhaps by providing the right mix of...