Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in Twentieth-Century Poland—The Politics of Boleslaw Piasecki

5. Years of Hope and Disappointment,1956–67

5 ||| Years of Hope and Disappointment, 1956–67 Three years after the death of Stalin, the Polish People’s Republic experienced the gravest crisis of its sociopolitical system to that point. By the end of 1956, the country had experienced a war at the top of the party leadership, a bloody revolt among the workers of Poznań, the specter of Soviet military intervention, and Gomułka’s return to power. Historians and journalists often refer to these events under the collective term Polski Październik (Polish October). A reference to the Bolshevik October Revolution in Russia, it accentuated the socialist character of the movement, which sought to democratize the system and to bring about a renewal of the communist party and society. Since it was doubtful whether the term “revolution ” applied to the events in Poland, the more oblique “October” proved the most convenient wording. One of the most frequently reproduced images from the fall of 1956 was that of Gomułka addressing hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic Poles in Warsaw. As Jerzy Giedroyc, the chief editor of the Paris-based monthly Kultura, put it, the Polish October was the only time when the communist party could integrate itself with the nation.1 The return of Gomułka was hailed as a great patriotic victory and the beginning of a new social contract between the rulers and the ruled, transforming the entire system. A number of modifications to the system proved long-lasting and even irreversible: the opening of the country to Western culture and the end of Socialist Realism in the arts; the partial rehabilitation of noncommunist chapters in the nation’s history; the twin phenomena of intellectual ferment and open debate, which refused to vanish even after the party belatedly tried to squelch them; and the establishment of outlets for the Catholic intelligentsia and dialogue with the Church. But gradually Gomułka’s “Polish road to socialism” also began 112 | Between the Brown and the Red to show its nasty side: increasing authoritarianism and chauvinism as well as assaults on unorthodox and reformist tendencies within the party. Nevertheless , the regime did abandon Stalinism, replacing it with a mishmash of ethnonationalism , populism, and communist orthodoxy. The growing reliance on nationalism reinforced the party’s domestic or indigenous credentials, but it also plunged the regime into a symbolic competition over ownership of national identity with the Church, which was bolstering its efforts to bring about an ethnoconfessional nationalism. Overall, this period was instrumental in developing the processes that eventually led to the ideological demobilization of the regime, the birth of the opposition, and the hegemony of the Church in the sphere of nationalist symbology. For Piasecki, October 1956 was a traumatizing time. Subjected to vehement attacks by liberal intellectuals and party reformers alike, he fought for his political survival. He also had to confront a revived Polish Catholic Church, which had come out of Stalinism united, strong, and increasingly popular. De-Stalinization ended Piasecki’s monopoly on the political representation of lay Catholics. The important question was to what degree Gomułka would support Piasecki’s aim of transforming PAX into a junior coalition partner and political party. The Villain of October Piasecki had refrained from taking any active stance during the initial stages of de-Stalinization. Instead, he cautiously advocated liberalization within the limits of ideological correctness, criticizing the cult of personality but also cherishing the “great achievements of socialism” in the pre-1953 period .2 At closed meetings with his collaborators, he was more outspoken, insisting that communism did not fit the Polish national character. He reportedly said, “In future Poland, Marxism will be replaced by national-radical socialism, based on the historical traditions of the Polish nation.”3 The regime, meanwhile, showed signs of uncharacteristic softness. The amnesty act passed by the Sejm in April 1956 practically emptied the jails of political prisoners. The party purged Bierut’s leading associates, including Jakub Berman, while the government arrested a number of high officials in the security apparatus and fired prosecutors who had distinguished themselves in Stalinist trials.4 The advent of debating societies, political rallies, and Years of Hope and Disappointment, 1956–67 | 113 candid news reports were evidence of the ferment of free discussion sweeping through the country. Jazz music was no longer considered subversive, and abstract art went on display in state galleries. As Polish historian Andrzej Friszke has observed, by the...