The Ontology of Becoming and the Ethics of Particularity

Notes

n ote s ................................... editor’s introduction 1. Dillon, Semiological Reductionism, 2. 2. Ibid., 3, 4. 3. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158. 4. For a more complete presentation of my views about the distinct, yet essentially complementary relationship between phenomenology and deconstruction, between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, see chapter 5 of my Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy. 5. Dillon, Semiological Reductionism, ix. 6. “To sustain my claim to relevance, I want this book to reach beyond the academic sphere to the larger world of critical minds who bring other sorts of criteria and other funds of experience to bear, people who live their lives thoughtfully and want to dig a bit deeper than popular media sometimes allow. . . . And, for those readers , the technical terminology required for condensation and precision, and the references to the relevant works . . . is a kind of academic shorthand that allows scholars to allude to complex thoughts without taking up limited time. . . . This is a hybrid work in the sense just explained” (Dillon, Beyond Romance, xiv). 7. Dillon, Beyond Romance, 1–2. 8. Nietzsche articulates his Dionysian pessimism as an alternative to all versions of romanticism and aestheticism throughout book 5 of The Gay Science, but especially in §370; pp. 327–31. 9. I did this kind of close editorial review for the fourth time during April 2011 in preparation for submitting the final manuscript to Ohio University Press. Art, Truth, and Illusion: Nietzsche’s Ontology chapter 1: art, truth, and illusion: nietzsche’s metaphysical skepticism Editor’s note: A version of this chapter was published as “Art, Truth, and Illusion: Nietzsche’s Metaphysical Skepticism,” Symposium 8, no. 2 (2004): 299–312. 1. I have adopted here the convention of capitalizing such terms as “Real” and “True” when the reality and truth they designate is conceived in absolute, infinite, or non-perspectival ways. 202 notes to pages 4–6 2. “Judgments, judgments of value, concerning life, for it or against it, can, in the end, never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms; in themselves such judgments are stupidities. . . . The value of life cannot be estimated. Not by the living, for they are an interested party” (TI, 474). 3. “Would it not be necessary for the tragic man . . . to desire a new art, the art of metaphysical comfort [die Kunst des metaphysischen Trostes] . . . ? —No, thrice no! O you young romantics: it would not be necessary! But it is highly probable that it will end that way, that you end that way—namely, ‘comforted,’ as it is written, in spite of all self-education for seriousness and terror, ‘comforted metaphysically’—in sum, as romantics end, as Christians” (BT, 26; W1, 18). 4. Editor’s note: Dillon will refer to the “wisdom” or “saying” of Silenus many times in the course of this book; it is a frequent touchstone for Dillon’s own views about what makes life worth living. Dillon’s use of the saying is drawn from BT, §3, where Nietzsche is quoting what seems to be an unnamed text: “There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus, without capturing him. When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. . . . At last, urged by the king, [Silenus] gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: ‘. . . What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon’” (BT, 42). Nietzsche uses quotes around this entire paragraph, but it is not clear what text— if one at all—he is quoting. At the end of the paragraph, he does offer the following citation: “Cf. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, lines 1224ff.” However, those lines of the play—chanted by the chorus—are not the above passage: they refer to the basic sentiment, but with no attribution to Silenus. The sentiment can also be found expressed in Cicero’s Dialogues, again without reference to Silenus. Thus we have here an ancient saying—a piece of Greek folklore—with no clear attribution . Nietzsche is the earliest person I have found who attributes the saying to the satyr Silenus, and all later such attributions I have found do so because of Nietzsche. 5. We fear what threatens to disrupt our tranquillity. This grounds a utilitarian morality that...