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50 three v Patronage and Policy When k ansas entered the Union in 1861, it was a small, deeply indebted state with barely one hundred thousand residents. Kansas had acquired its debts largely because the cost of funding multiple constitutional conventions and the need to routinely investigate electoral fraud vastly overtaxed its slim coffers. In addition, Kansas had just suffered through a severe drought and it was widely expected that the new state would struggle to meet its fiscal responsibilities .1 Indeed, there is little doubt that Kansas would have struggled to find its footing in the federal system in the best of circumstances. Kansas did not have the luxury of time, however, and these challenges would quickly pale in comparison to those the new state faced when war broke out shortly after its admission to the Union. As the Civil War raged on, its battles largely fought outside the state’s borders, Kansas experienced a political war of its own within state lines. This war was made worse by its territorial history and by an ongoing struggle for power, place, and prestige within Kansas that continued during the war in a heightened atmosphere of suddenly and significantly raised stakes. In the four years of the Civil War, Kansas had three executives: Republicans Charles Robinson , Thomas Carney, and Samuel Crawford. Although the conflicts within the state were among Republicans, they were hard-fought, intraparty battles for control of federal patronage. In addition, Kansans witnessed an odd and detrimental tug-of-war between the governors and Senator James H. Lane for control over how Kansas’s regiments were raised, commanded, and dispatched. Lane’s rivalry with Charles Robinson went back to the territorial era, when they had struggled for control of the Free-State Party. Robinson had come to the territory as an agent of the New England Emigrant Aid Company and quickly became a political powerhouse, being elected governor under the Topeka Constitution submitted to Congress in 1856. But Robinson was challenged for leadership from an unexpected rival. A Democratic congressman from Indiana, Lane had been a victim of his yes vote for the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and left Indiana to resurrect his career in Kansas. Initially, he supported the proslavery territorial legislature and attempted to organize the Democratic Party in the territory. Meet- Patronage and Policy 51 ing with little success, Lane soon abandoned the party to become an influential leader in the free-state movement instead. The contrasts between the two men were as extreme as their politics and methods. Historian Albert Castel perhaps captures the rivalry best when he describes Charles Robinson as “ambitious, hardworking and strong-willed,” while saving the colorful language for James Lane, whom he depicts as “vulgar, tempestuous , of fluctuating courage, and utterly unscrupulous,” a “cynic who posed as a zealot, a demagogue who claimed to be a statesman.”2 Even when assessed with a more sympathetic eye, there is little doubt that Lane was an opportunist of the first order who managed to leverage himself into a position of tremendous power within Civil War Kansas. Lane’s influence was due entirely to his ability to ingratiate himself with the new Republican president, Abraham Lincoln. A friendship with Mark Delahay, a close friend and cousin to Lincoln, provided Lane’s initial access to the president. And at a time when many of the territory’s political leaders preferred the Republican Party’s better-known men for the presidency, Lane had campaigned for Lincoln. Although Lincoln refused Lane’s offer of a bodyguard escort after his victory, Lane soon made himself indispensable. In Washington with a large contingent of Kansans seeking appointments, Lane organized the Frontier Guard to help protect the capital in the aftermath of the firing on Fort Sumter. After two weeks, the Frontier Guard was mustered out, but his service won Lane unprecedented access to the new president. By the end of April 1861, Lane was handling the appointment process for Kansas and the president often endorsed his choices without reading what he was signing.3 One of the most interesting aspects of this relationship is Lincoln’s continued support of Lane even after it became clear that Lane’s excessive ambition greatly affected state politics and demanded considerable attention from the president and his secretary of war, Edwin Stanton. As a result of this relationship with Lincoln, Lane controlled patronage to the detriment of Samuel C. Pomeroy, Kansas’s other senator, and Martin Conway, its congressman, as well...

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