Reexamining Deconstruction and Determinate Religion: Toward a Religion <i>with</i> Religion

Chapter 1, Reply 2 Apologetics after Identity? — A Response to J. Aaron Simmons

69 Chapter1,Reply2 Apologetics after Identity? —A Response to J. Aaron Simmons StephenMinister n his “Apologetics after Objectivity,” J. Aaron Simmons makes a compelling case for the legitimacy and necessity of a rational defense of Christianity in continental philosophy of religion and, more broadly, in the lives of Christian believers in a postmodern era. I find little to criticize in this conclusion, and were I Pentecostal, I would probably have exclaimed “Amen!” many times as I was reading the essay. One such place would have been Simmons’s insightful and appropriate contrast between Caputo’s and Westphal’s characterizations of postmodernity’s implications for the philosophy of religion. However, though like Simmons I generally side with Westphal in this debate, I would like to push on Simmons’s and Westphal’s position a bit by challenging the notion of “identity” that Simmons deploys throughout his essay. Importantly, Simmons sees the tension between Christian faith and postmodern philosophy as rooted on the existential level. His concern is not merely about the logical consistency of certain claims, but about the consistency or integrity of a practical, lived identity. This is not to oppose theoretical belief-claims to a practical, lived identity, but instead to acknowledge that belief-claims play a role in clarifying and constituting our practical, lived identities. So, consistency I 70 Stephen Minister of our lived identities requires some consistency among the beliefclaims related to those identities. But, we can ask, how much consistency or integrity ought we to expect or even desire in our practical, lived identities? Caputo, in a direct response to Westphal, suggests an answer to this question. He writes: “‘I’ am a multiplicity of voices competing within me so that what I call the ‘I’ is at best a shorthand for the one who does the talking....Being at odds with ourselves is not so much part of being a self, or something we just have to put up with; it is pretty much what we mean by a ‘self,’ whereas a dull mono-vocal settled self-identity is pretty much what we mean by a post.”1 Caputo thinks that this view of the self is implied by postmodern philosophy and is thus one of the ways in which postmodern philosophy goes beyond merely epistemological or methodological reminders. My purpose here is not to consider whether and how this view of the self is implied by postmodern philosophy; rather, I am interested in the way in which it challenges Simmons’s project of reconciling his Christian faith with his postmodern philosophy. Caputo raises this point as a challenge to Westphal’s reconciliation of his Christian faith with his postmodern philosophy, but Westphal, perhaps too easily, swats it away. In a reply to Caputo’s criticism, Westphal states simply that he agrees with Caputo’s point and goes on to provide biblical backing for this position, citing the confession made by the father of a boy possessed by an evil spirit: “I believe; help my unbelief!” (Mark 9:24).2 While this confession gives evidence for the possibility of a divided self, a self that both believes and does not believe, the confession does not concede the necessity of a divided self, since it is aimed precisely at overcoming this division. More than that, priority is given to one voice (the believing voice), while the very presence of the second voice is seen as a personal failing that ideally could be overcome. Far from agreeing with Caputo that a multiplicity of voices is “pretty much what we mean by a ‘self,’” Westphal’s use of this biblical quote seems to suggest that a multiplicity of voices is pretty much what we mean by “lack of faith,” maybe even “sin.” Be that as it may, in the present context what interests me is not the metaphysics of the self, but the relation between belief-commitments. As noted, the father’s confession gives priority to the believing voice over the voice Apologetics after Identity? 71 that troubles this belief. Perhaps it is precisely this prioritization that Caputo means to question. The father has his doubts, but he does not really seem to be haunted by the undecidability of the situation. He knows what he ought to believe, even if he cannot bring himself to fully believe it. For Caputo, the multiplicity of voices undermines this prioritization by denying privilege to any particular voice. The voice of...