Reexamining Deconstruction and Determinate Religion: Toward a Religion <i>with</i> Religion

Ch. 1. Apologetics after Objectivity

23 ONE Apologetics after Objectivity J.AaronSimmons “My atheism gets on in the churches, all the churches, do you understand that?” —Jacques Derrida “For some reason or another, I get invited to Christian colleges with evangelical cultures to talk about deconstruction and religion . I don’t know why they do this.” — JohnCaputo “Come now, let us reason together, says the Lord.” — Isaiah1:18 INTRODUCTION The question of this chapter is whether or not a “rational defense” can be given for the determinate truth-claims of Christianity within the context of continental philosophy of religion (CPR).1 Simply put, is a postmodern (specifically Christian) apologetics possible? Let me unambiguously make clear that I am wary of “classical” apologetics as traditionally found in the history of philosophy, and especially as displayed sometimes in contemporary philosophy of religion and popular Christian writing, which I find to be all too often defined by epistemic arrogance and theological triumphalism.2 Accordingly, I am not concerned, here, with whether or not such an apologetics will be successful in the sense of being “convincing” to non-Christians. My goal is simply to inquire into whether an apologetic task is coherent within postmodernism and, if so, what such a practice might 24 J. Aaron Simmons look like. Now, if apologetics requires objectivity, universality, and neutrality, then the postmodern critique of reason and the emphases on subjectivity, singularity, and existential situatedness that accompany such a critique would appear to make apologetics impossible (and rightfully so). In other words, if the practice of apologetics is “after” objectivity in the sense of seeking to achieve or obtain such an objective perspective, then attempting to articulate a postmodern apologetics is a task that is best abandoned. However, if one attempts to formulate an apologetics “after” objectivity in the sense of following on and appropriating the postmodern critique of Enlightenment notions of objectivity, then the proposal of a postmodern apologetics need not seem quite so odd. Being careful about which notion of “after” one is deploying is crucial for understanding the difference between attempting a simplistic rejection of “Religion without Religion” for specifically Christian reasons on the one hand, and attempting to think about the possibilities of “Religion with Religion” in the very context of the without, as it were, on the other hand. While the former tries to make faith safe, the latter tries honestly to own up to the risk of faith without abandoning the content of that faith. Depending on what one means by “postmodernism ” and what one understands “continental philosophy of religion” to entail as a philosophical practice, I propose that engaging in apologetics is not something that postmodernists must necessarily abandon. In order to defend this claim I will proceed as follows. In part 1, I will, first, explicitly formulate a possible dilemma between postmodernism and Pentecostalism (a dilemma that is both existential and logical) that illuminates the need for a postmodern apologia for Christianity. Second, I will consider what I take to be the two main varieties of continental philosophy of religion occurring in the deconstructive or phenomenological tradition—which I will term metaphysical postmodernism and epistemological postmodernism.3 I will look in detail at the work of John Caputo and Merold Westphal as examples of the two views, respectively, and suggest that while Caputo’s account potentially leads to incoherence, Westphal’s does not. Accordingly, when I speak of postmodern apologetics, I understand postmodernism to be defined according to an epistemological conception. Apologetics after Objectivity 25 In part 2, I turn my attention to the possibility of a positive postmodern apologetics and give some suggestions as to what such a project might involve. Specifically, I will consider the work of Justin Martyr as an example of how apologetics was originally characterized by an existential relevance that has been lacking in much of contemporary professional philosophical discourse. Then, drawing upon John G. Stackhouse Jr. and David K. Clark, I will sketch some characteristics that any postmodern apologetics will need to possess if it is to remain legitimately postmodern and yet legitimately apologetic. In my conclusion , I will raise and respond to a Kierkegaardian objection. It is my hope that this chapter will demonstrate that one can affirm and defend determinate Christian belief while still affirming and defending a critical postmodern perspective (that is, religion with religion continues to appropriate and take very seriously the “without ”). Said slightly more poetically, it is my contention that one...