The Philosophy of Edith Stein

6. Is the State Responsible for the Immortal Soul of the Person?

6 Is the State Responsible for the Immortal Soul of the Person?
If Aristotle’s insight that politics implies metaphysics is considered valid, then Edith Stein has something relevant to say, for she gives an ontic description of the state.1 Stein’s phenomenology of the state describes the various Abschattungen or profiles constituting the being of the state. One of the key operative principles of the being of the state is that it is viewed in personal terms, yet it is not conceived as a superperson or a superindividual. The state is defined by the relationships that exist within the entity of the state, and one of the foundational relationships within the state is that of the community of persons. A person is described as a physico-psycho-spiritual unity characterized by his or her own individualized personality core (Persönlichkeitskern). This very same personality core is described as being localized in the human soul, the immortal soul. If the soul of the person is immortal, and if the state is seen as characterized by its personal essence as incarnated in the community of the state, then we must ask: Is the state responsible for the immortal soul of the person? Why or why not? And, if the state is responsible , how is it responsible? This chapter will explore Stein’s phenomenology in the hope of bringing to the fore questions that should be 99 asked today, especially if we still view the state in ontological (metaphysical ) terms. I shall proceed by first giving a brief description of the nature of the state followed by a description of the nature of personal community. Given such descriptions, I will begin to explore what responsibility means, in a Steinian sense, and what the state’s responsibility consists of vis-à-vis the immortal soul specialiter and the person generaliter. THE STATE In chapter 3, dedicated to Stein’s political philosophy, I developed in detail Stein’s phenomenology of the state. I briefly take up some of the same description again in this chapter, and though it may seem redundant , I feel it is necessary in order to develop arguments about the relationship between the soul and the state. The ontic structure of the state is made up of three basic elements (Stein borrows the foundational distinctions of Georg Simmel): mass, society, and community. The mass is the most basic associative relationship of individuals that one can find in the state. In the mass, people dwell next to one another, but have no form of concrete or interpersonal relationships. “Individuals influence one another without recognizing the force of the influence exerted or received” ( US, 1). There is contact, but consciousness of self or other is limited. In the Beiträge, the psychic state of the mass is primarily typified as psychische Ansteckung, or psychic contagion. (B, 168) One individual is literally contaminated by the other without being aware that one is contaminated psychologically. As in chapter 2, Stein gives the classic example of babies crying. A society is characterized by its possessing an objective, common goal. Members of a society work together in order to achieve that specific end. The unity of a society is colored by the specific end the society is trying to achieve. Hence, the Göttingen Philosophical Society had its members united around a specific end, namely, the advancement of philosophy and phenomenology. Moreover, there is a consciousness of the end and a consciousness of the responsibility necessary to achieve that specific end. 100 The Philosophy of Edith Stein The community is characterized by an experience of consciousness in which “one seizes (or dwells in) the experience of the other” (ineinandergreifen) and vice versa (US, 2). This is the most spiritual relation of the persons dwelling in the state, for here one needs to be conscious of the interiority of the other and of the self — an awareness that is made possible in Einfühlung, or empathy. The community, however, does not absorb the individual, and neither do individuals completely define the character of a community (B, 236–38). The community dwells both objectively (externally) and subjectively (internally ) in relation to the person. Unlike a society, whose objective is external to the persons who seek to attain it, the community or spirit of the community dwells within the person. The community is described as “arising,” whereas...